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Ahmad abu Maher al Yamani, born in 1924 in Suhmata, Palestine, was one of the 
foremost refugee leaders in 1950s and ‘60s Lebanon. A school principal by occupation, 
Yamani built and directed the leading civic associations in exile, including the UNRWA 
Teachers’ Association, the popular committees of the camps, the al Shabab al ‘Arabi al 
Filastini branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement, and the Union of Palestinian 
Workers. These associations asserted the interests of poor and formerly peasant refugees 
to UNRWA and Lebanese authorities, and they laid the foundations for the armed 
struggle. This biography describes the maturation of camp organization with more color. 
It also traces continuity between the social transformations of the Mandate era and camp 
society in the diaspora. The processes in Palestine that drew peasants to continuing 
education, and then to urban areas and to wage labor, and to mass politics and national 
identification – these refined Yamani into a young leader. Most of all, this biography 
foregrounds grassroots civic leadership among Palestinians in exile. 
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There is a poetry to the youthfulness of the Palestinian armed struggle. It was led 
by young men, chief among them Yasser Arafat and George Habash, who were both 
university students in 1948, and others the same age or younger still.1 It represented 
rebirth, vitality, and a healthy sense of indignation. These were not the same leaders who 
lost Palestine, and not their disciples. They carried within them bitterness, but could 
hardly know guilt. They were a clean break with the past. 
The resistance gestated in the harsh deprivation of exile, the base austerity of the 
UNRWA camps, and the toughening nursery of manual labor. The young leaders waited 
patiently for the populist movements of the Arab world to emancipate the masses then 
wage the war of Palestinian liberation; they fought courageously in their armies, too. 
Then, when defeat struck again in 1967, they erupted. The armed Palestinian Resistance 
Movement, having captured the popular imagination, now won the people’s devotion. In 
Jordan, the Battle of Karamah reclaimed some dignity for the Palestinians, while guerrilla 
operations and terrorism showcased their power. With the 1969 Cairo Accords between 
the PLO and Lebanon, the Palestinians had thrown off the state’s shackles and liberated 
their camps. The Movement, for a few promising years, flourished. 
This is an honorable narrative, and largely truthful. But were the Palestinians 
breaking with their past? And were the 1950s and 60s simply a period of gestation, when 
the refugees absorbed lessons in despair before erupting? This biography of Ahmad al 
Yamani, a labor organizer in Palestine turned civic organizer in exile, traces continuity 
and civic leadership in a historiography dominated by the motifs of rupture, rebirth, and 
                                                
1 The years they were born: Habash (1926); Arafat (1929); Wadi’ Haddad (1927); Nayef Hawatmeh 
(1938); Ghassan Kanafani (1936); Leila Khalid (1944); Salah abu Iyad Khalaf (1933); Khalil abu Jihad al 
Wazir (1935) 
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armed struggle. This should be considered an elaboration of Palestinian history, not a 
criticism of it. It reveals another dimension of agency in the refugee population, apart 
from its militarism: a vigorous and ongoing assertion of its autonomy in civic life, which 
manifested from the very beginning of exile. 
Ahmad Husayn abu Maher al Yamani was one of the earliest and most important 
leaders of the Palestine branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement, a pan-Arab political 
movement that began as a student organization at the American University of Beirut and 
spawned the militant People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Habash led it. 
Yamani was not much older than the heralded leaders of the armed struggle – he was 
born in 1924 – but he possessed considerable maturity. Twenty-five years old when he 
was exiled, Yamani had already organized laborers in Jaffa and Haifa as a local leader of 
the Palestinian Arab Workers Society and worked for the Mandate administration in 
Haifa and Acre. Yamani grew up in a peasant family in the Upper Galilee village of 
Suhmata and attended college in Jerusalem; he had been old enough to recall al Qassam’s 
Peasant Revolt in 1935 and the Great Revolt of 1936-39. He had attended Arab 
Nationalist societies in Jaffa, and fought in a Nationalist guerrilla cell in the 1948 War. 
Scholarship on British Mandate Palestine traces how the growing muscularity of 
Zionism accelerated the social transformations that challenged the country’s existing 
political hierarchy. New civic leadership emerged from the peasant, laboring, and petit 
bourgeois classes to assert new identities, demand concessions, and negotiate new 
solidarities. Unfortunately, the existing scholarship on Palestinians in exile largely fails to 
reflect on these changes. While the armed struggle motif accepts that the Nakba fractured 
hierarchies and delegitimized the old elite, it does not identify that the Mandate era 
produced the leaders, like Yamani, who would rebuild civil society.  
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Yamani was one of many unheralded civic leaders who in the 1950s asserted the 
interests of poor and peasant refugees, and who forged constituencies and alliances to 
negotiate with UNRWA and state authorities from a position of strength. This 
groundwork has shaped Palestinian civic life until today; it also enabled the armed 
struggle. This thesis aims to demonstrate two things: the continuity between Mandate-era 
Palestinian history and their history in exile, and the nature of civic leadership in exile. 
These are overlapping goals.  
CONTINUITY 
As Rashid Khalidi notes of the political currents that emerged among the 
Palestinians after the nakba: 
Even a cursory examination of these new groups and their ideology reveals that 
they represented a continuation of the Palestinian national movement as it 
developed from the roots we have examined into the Mandate period, until its 
defeat and collapse in the wake of the 1948 war. … This is true despite the major 
differences between the pre-1948 and post-1948 movements, among them the fact 
that in no case did the new movements include members of the leadership drawn 
from the old Palestinian elite, which was considered in some measure as being 
responsible for having ‘lost’ Palestine.2 
The examination has indeed been cursory. The narrative, developed through political 
histories and repeated uncritically in anthropological studies of the camps, is as follows:  
When Great Britain inherited Palestine after WWI, it governed the Arab 
population through a class of local notables, a historically imagined but robust category 
that denotes the wealthy, educated, landowning Sunni elite who once served as the local 
agents of the decentralized Ottoman Empire. Though these leaders, the notables, had 
professed strongly nationalist sentiments, and desired, mostly sincerely, for independence 
from Britain, the cessation of the Zionist project, and self-rule over all of Palestine, they 
                                                
2 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 180. 
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were too close to their British overlords to push forcefully for these aims. Nor were they 
in tune with deteriorating conditions of the Arab peasants and urban laborers; instead of 
harnessing their resentment, the notables counseled patience and compromise with 
Zionists and the British authorities. Meanwhile, the peasant, laboring, and petit bourgeois 
classes were radicalized by despair, and they organized themselves into new forms of 
association and resistance, “such as boy-scout and other youth organizations with a 
nationalist or religious political orientation, the Young Men’s Muslim Association, labor 
unions, and professional associations.” Through these institutions, a broad segment of 
Palestinian society fashioned for itself an assertive, nationalistic identity that was 
unafraid to challenge existing structures of political authority and make demands in its 
self-interest.3  
Then came the defeat of 1948, and the notables were swept away: 
At a stroke, the older members of families like the al-Husaynis, Nashashibis, and 
al-Khalidis, who had dominated Palestinian politics from the 1920s through the 
1940s, were replaced by very young men who were educated in the new schools 
that had sprung up in Palestine during the Mandate, were often graduates of 
Universities in Cairo, Beirut, and Damascus, and generally came from poor or 
middle-class backgrounds.4 
The narrative in exile continues along the lines of the trope of youth, introduced at the 
beginning. The new, young leaders surged past the older generation and unlocked the 
potential of the camps and the vitality of the Palestinians through militarism and patriotic 
identification. Their political inclinations were naturally rooted in the Palestinian national 
movement of the Mandate era, but radicalized through the defeat of 1948 and the 
collective Arab soul-searching that followed. 
                                                
3 See Matthews, Confronting an Empire; Khalidi, Iron Cage. Quote from Khalidi, 82. 
4 Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, 180. 
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In fact, the transition between old and new, though catalyzed by defeat, was less 
stark than that, and it did not occur just at the instigation of students and bourgeois 
nationalists. It was mediated instead through the camps, through leaders who survived the 
Nakba, and through perceptions and behaviors imprinted with the legacies of the 
Mandate era. Peteet (1991) traced continuity between the two periods (before and after 
the nakba) through women’s associations and the revision of gender roles: 
Regional feminist currents and a general interest in social reforms, in conjunction 
with the colonial threat and Palestinian nationalism, served as the initial catalyst 
for women to begin a fifty-year history of participation in the national political 
arena. The early activists set the precedent for subsequent political organizing. 
They inaugurated the process of accumulating experience and skills in political 
work that was transmitted to a younger generation. Moreover, they broke the first 
crucial boundaries of the normative gender order. … Peasant and urban middle 
and lower middle class women conferred legitimacy on the phenomenon of 
women in the battlefield.5  
Similarly, this biography of Yamani shows that the processes that transformed the 
position of the peasants and workers in Mandate Palestine produced a generation of 
leaders who shouldered the task of rebuilding civil society in exile. 
REBUILDING IN THE 1950S 
Yamani’s accomplishments and those of others like him include: restarting the 
scouting movement, unions, and cultural clubs; creating new schools and invigorating 
UNRWA ones; establishing teachers’ associations, student associations, parent 
associations, women’s associations, popular committees; organizing demonstrations, 
commemorations, and sports tournaments; and producing mass media. 
Their value cannot be overstated. Schools are natural vehicles for the transmission 
of a shared identity, and though UNRWA’s original curriculum was bare, the Palestinian 
                                                
5 Peteet, Gender in Crisis, 65. 
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teachers demanded the instatement of Palestinian history and geography. When UNRWA 
was slow to comply, they developed the curriculum themselves. Yamani’s memoirs 
reveal that the Palestinian administrators also installed libraries in their schools; they also 
had their students recite anthems and rehearse nationalist plays; and they organized 
scouting and sports events, which affirmed the value of communal self-reliance. 
Countless Palestinians, who ascended to all levels of refugee society, passed through the 
schools. Naji al ‘Ali, a famous cartoonist who drew Handhala, a symbol of Palestinian 
defiance, attended the UNRWA school in ‘Ain al Hilwah. He recalled of it, “For a 
semester, my teacher was Abu Maher al Yamani. Abu Maher taught us to raise the 
Palestinian flag and wave it, and he told us who were our friends and who were our 
enemies. And when he noticed my passion for drawing, he told me, ‘Draw, but always 
for the nation.’”6 
 
 
Figure 1.  “Handhala” by Naji al ‘Ali7 
                                                
6 Ḥamad, “Min Suḥmātā badaʾa al-mishwār.” 
7 Source: “Handhala.” 
 7 
Other studies have mentioned the publications circulating in the camps, some 
produced as periodicals and many as pamphlets and fliers, but few have examined the 
production of these publications or the contexts in which they were read. Walid Kazziha, 
for example, studied al Tha’r, a highly influential, underground periodical circulating 
among Arab Nationalists and in the camps (its weekly readership peaked at 15,000 
copies), for its ideological tracts on Arab Nationalism, Jews and Zionism, imperialism, 
and so forth.8 What he doesn’t note, however, is the involvement of teachers and students 
in its production and distribution. Yamani and Salah Salah (a Palestinian labor organizer 
in Sidon, born c. 1933, whom I interviewed) recall that teachers used to contribute 
articles regularly, teach the paper to their classes, and have young cadres smuggle copies 
to other camps. Yamani, his students, and other school administrators also distributed 
thousands of pamphlets throughout the fifties through the mail to leading refugees, 
UNRWA administrators, and other teachers. This adds up to a clearer picture of the 
media’s function in exile; it was not just a top-down explication of ideology, but a forum 
that built a Palestinian community through its participatory distribution and its 
expositions on civil affairs, in addition to functioning as a means to threaten the 
authorities and mobilize a mass audience. Yamani has included several articles and 
pamphlets in his memoirs.9 
Civic leaders also built community through rallies. These were especially 
elaborate on days of commemoration, chiefly the anniversaries of the Nakba, the 
Partition, and the Battle of Hittin. Yamani and his associates organized several between 
1952-4 in Sidon, and though they seem to have been confined to ‘Ain al Hilwah (by order 
                                                
8 Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation, 30–31, 50–51, 56. 
9 Researchers can also read an archive of al Tha’r in America, though it is incomplete and in deteriorating 
condition. It is available from Princeton University Library. 
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of the security forces), they drew Palestinians from the surrounding areas and camps, as 
well. Students and scouts would parade at these events and recite anthems, and 
community leaders would give speeches and lead marches and chants. On one occasion, 
Yamani’s students put on a play he wrote about the Balfour Declaration and Britain’s 
treachery. By the end of the decade, the rallies had grown to great proportions, occupying 
the municipal stadiums of Beirut and Tripoli, attended by Palestinians from across the 
country as well as Lebanese, and hosting even Prime Minister Rashid Karami at the 
podium. This the civic leaders had accomplished through a decade of patient organizing 
and through alliances they forged with Lebanese associations, for example the anti-
Zionist Kul Muwatin Khafir. 
Scouts also receive just passing mention in political histories, when they appear 
from the documents studied here to have been instrumental to forging community in 
exile. Scouting expeditions brought the camps closer to one another, as young men would 
hike dozens of kilometers to another settlement and overnight with the Palestinians there. 
The young Palestinian men would also hike with Lebanese scouts, and in 1956 they 
attended a retreat in Alexandria with scouts from across the Arab world; these activities 
broke the isolation of the refugee identity, teaching young men that they belonged in a 
larger, Arab community. Finally, scouts deserve mention for providing military training 
to refugees and sending them on to the militias. 
ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES 
Ethnographic studies of camp life in the 1950s and 60s have shown that 
Palestinians shaped their settings in diffuse and organic ways. They did this, for example, 
through the spacialization of their settlement, gathering near their old neighbors and 
naming camp neighborhoods after Palestinian villages and towns. “Burj al Barajneh camp 
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was constituted by a spatial array of a number of northern villages in six named areas: 
Kweikat, Tarshiha, al Kabri, Shaikh Daoud, al Ghabisiyya, and al Chaab.”10 These 
reconstituted affiliations not only yielded social and economic support; the 
agglomerations empowered refugees against UNRWA and the authorities through their 
sheer numbers, and could resist further displacement and neglect. But the conditions of 
exile – new geographies, forced relocation, crowded living quarters and the end of 
privacy, marginalized legal status, poverty, and so forth – naturally engendered 
adaptations, and refugees forged new affiliations and identifications, altered social 
practices, and modified reconstituted social institutions. The example of the role of the 
village mukhtar in exile, and the administrative posts that would come to replace him, is 
illustrative: 
Initially, village patterns of social organization and status were viable and relief 
agencies dealt directly with al mahkatir as village heads to help compile lists of 
residents to be registered as refugees. … Al makhatir distributed rations, and 
UNRWA appointed them as Camp Service Officers, a liaison position between 
camp residents and UNRWA. Corruption and patronage eventually led UNRWA 
to develop the position of Field Officers, chosen more on the basis of wider 
influence and merit. Eventually they resembled village notables in the emergent 
status system of the camps.11 
Teachers tried privately to add Palestinian themes to their curriculums:  
Despite the absence of a specifically Palestinian curriculum, UNRWA schooling 
was an unprecedented institutional forum, functioning in much the same way that 
schooling does in the rest of the world, inculcating nationalism and constructing 
national subjects. Strongly nationalistic, often politically active, and committed to 
youth and the development of their Palestinian identity, teachers quietly adjusted 
the curriculum to incorporate Palestinian themes. This was a dangerous strategy, 
for they could be fired if they were caught.12 
                                                
10 Peteet, Landscape, 111.  
11 Ibid., 113. 
12 Ibid., 118. 
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Refugees also manifested their agency through construction in the camps. Tents 
originally symbolized the expectation of return and solid construction the delay thereof, 
but after years in exile, practical concerns began to mount.  
By 1961, tents, those despised symbols of misery and homelessness, were a relic 
of the past. The transformation to more solidly built cement houses was gradual. 
First, a cement block foundation one to two feet in height would be constructed 
around the perimeter of the tent to keep out rain and prevent drafts. From there it 
was a matter of building upward, level by level, gradually replacing the tent with 
a cement structure.13 
But construction wrought conflict between refugees, UNRWA, and the state that 
touched at the root of their mutual distrust over whether UNRWA aimed to resettle 
refugees and whether refugees deserved protracted aid. 
NEW INTERPRETATIONS 
My research supports the central thrust of these rich studies, that there is a 
reciprocal relationship between place and agency. “Place is always in a state of 
becoming; embedded in local contexts, it acts upon them. … Refugees were the driving 
force in generating places as meaningful constructs within the constraints imposed by 
structural features and forms of external power.”14 We must treat the setting of exile as 
dynamic, malleable, to an extent, to the will of the refugees. I am elaborating on this and 
supporting already well-defended conclusions. But I am also adding some new 
interpretations. The documents in this thesis indicate that there was an element of civic 
leadership that has so far gone unacknowledged but is integral to any account of 
adaptation, agency, and resistance. Refugees, according to my research, pushed the 
boundaries of their constraints in the 1950s and 60s more than the ethnographic studies 
have suggested. 
                                                
13 Ibid., 109. 
14 Ibid., 130. 
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 The documents presented herein deepen our understanding of the phenomena 
I’ve cited from Peteet, above. UNRWA relied on camp intermediaries, and makhatir 
were naturally suited for these roles. The Agency hired Palestinian Field Officers to act 
as its agents, as well. But refugees also represented themselves through institutions of 
their own design, namely popular committees and Al Shabab al ‘Arabi al Filastini. 
Popular Committees were councils of residents that formed in each refugee concentration 
to manage civic and administrative affairs. Composed of authority figures such as 
teachers, shaykhs, and leaders of the women and workers’ associations, the Committees 
carved out a space of communal self-rule and conflict resolution. They also represented 
each camp as a political unit to UNRWA, the state, and al Shabab al ‘Arabi al Filastini. 
Al Shabab was a network of leaders among the many camps who coordinated political 
activities – such as rallies, boycotts, and petitions – and managed the scouts, published al 
Tha’r and its successors, managed a militia and linked to other militias, and represented 
the refugee population as a unit to authorities. (Technically, al Shabab was the Lebanon 
branch of the Palestine section of the Arab Nationalist Movement, or, the Lebanon 
branch of the predecessor of the militant PFLP. It operated semi-autonomously of its 
parent organization, though.)15 By the late 1950s, al Shabab was able to correspond 
directly with and receive audiences with the upper echelons of UNRWA and the state. 
The documents also indicate that the refugees exerted more control over 
education and through education than the ethnographic studies have credited to them. 
Teachers and principals were the predominant camp leaders before al Shabab matured in 
                                                
15 Al Shabab al ‘Arabi al Filastini deserves to be distinguished from its parent organization. The broader 
Arab Nationalist Movement’s doctrinaire leadership launched it into political conflicts from Egypt to Iraq, 
but refugees – especially camp residents – had more pressing concerns: to manage their own welfare in 
exile and to return to Palestine promptly. So with consideration to the unique hardships that befell the 
refugees in Lebanon, al Shabab operated semi-autonomously of the central ANM and focused on local 
priorities. The Shabab network appears to have penetrated deep into camps and was led by camp residents. 
I discuss this further in Chapter 3. 
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1956-57, outside of the village leaders and makhatir who derived their power from their 
cooperation with the UNRWA and their ties to the fading Arab Higher Committee (a 
representation of the Palestinian former political elite). At UNRWA’s training courses in 
1951 and ‘52, local Palestinian teachers’ associations from Syria and Lebanon privately 
formed an umbrella UNRWA Teachers’ Association, which represented the refugees to 
authorities through petitions, negotiations, and strikes when necessary. The local teacher 
and parent associations were functional precursors of the emerging network of popular 
committees, and in fact the two affiliations, of teachers and al Shabab, shared between 
them many community leaders. 
Not only did the Teachers’ Association manage to get UNRWA to adopt a 
Palestinian curriculum, it also obliged the Agency to offer more secondary level classes, 
open secondary schools, and open technical institutes, and to hire more teachers and 
reduce class sizes. The teachers also roped UNRWA into sponsoring inter-camp sports 
competitions and securing stadiums for this use, and they taught literacy classes, led the 
scouts, and raised money to buy books. And when UNRWA fired Yamani from school 
administration for his political activities, he went on to found two schools in Burj al 
Barajnah camp and mold them according to his principles. These were the King Saud 
Charity School, financed by Saudi Arabia and supported by Egypt, and Lebanese 
Secondary School – Burj al Barajnah, financed and supported by the Arab Nationalist 
Movement. 
I am telling Yamani’s biography chronologically. This reveals the continuities 
between pre-Nakba Palestine and exile and between the various organizations Yamani 
directed, which may not have been clear in this introduction. They occur through 
association, in labor circles in Palestine, and re-association, usually in teaching and 
nationalist circles in Lebanon. Readers will notice that camp leaders receive crucial 
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support for their initiatives from outsiders; in this narrative, the Saudi King, a Lebanese 
political association, and two well-positioned Palestinians in the UNRWA administration 
all play supporting roles at one point or another.  
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In Chapter 1, I narrate Yamani’s life in 
Palestine. This section weaves in elements of the social transformation of Mandate 
Palestine. Palestinian Arab society changed considerably between 1924, when Yamani 
was born, and 1943, around when he graduated from the Arab College in Jerusalem and 
joined the workforce, in both the urban and rural spheres. As a result, Yamani entered a 
political world very different from the one he was born into, one without a national 
leadership; where the participatory domain had expanded from the educated, urban 
classes to workers and artisans and peasants; and where villagers migrated, seasonally, in 
greater numbers between rural and urban areas and acquired jobs in manufacturing and 
bureaucracy. These changes, though consequential, occurred only in the background of 
Yamani’s early life, though they are reflected in it and in incidents he recounts in his 
memoirs. So the first part of the first chapter foregrounds the Palestinian Arab social 
transformation, because its results determined Palestinian society at its 1948 fracture and 
left young men like Yamani as the civic leaders in exile; this section intersperses 
accounts from Yamani’s childhood and teenage years accordingly. The second part of the 
chapter relies more heavily on his memoirs, when, as a working adult, he became an actor 
in the social and political spheres. 
Chapter 2 covers Yamani’s life from 1949 to 1955. These are the years when 
Yamani entered exile and when UNRWA expelled him from his employment as a teacher 
and principal for political activity. Yamani’s primary affiliation during this period was 
with the UNRWA Teachers’ Association  
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Chapter 3 narrates his life from 1955 to 1959. Yamani escalated his involvement 
with al Shabab during this time, and by the end of it, the group has emerged as the 
predominant civic leadership association in the camps of Lebanon. This section weaves 
in a critique on the existing scholarship on the Arab Nationalist Movement, which can be 
read as a critique of the armed struggle motif in Palestinian history, as well. The reader 
may notice that Yamani is proudly and fervently Arab Nationalist. This thesis is not a 
meditation on or an explication of the ideology, though. I bring up Arab Nationalism in 
the context of civic structures, instead; the ANM’s initiatives proved integral to the 
organization of the camps and to the structure of civic leadership, so I discuss them here. 
The primary source for these three chapters is Yamani’s memoirs, which include 
some of his own writing and plenty of his own correspondence and correspondence of the 
UNRWA Teachers’ Association and al Shabab. They include a few reprints of al Tha’r 
and of Arab Nationalist and ANM pamphlets, as well. I also refer sporadically to other 
Arabic sources and to interviews I conducted with other civic leaders. 
The conclusion relates this biography to the political evolution of the camps, 
culminating in their liberation from Lebanese authority in 1969 and the hegemony of the 
PLO. I argue that the year’s sudden developments depended on Yamani’s patient civic 
leadership over the two decades before, which in turn reflected his maturation in 
Palestine before that. This study ends on that significant year, because an examination of 
Yamani’s later life would tread worn territory in Palestinian studies and yield few 
revelations. As befits a leader of Yamani’s experience, he was elected to the Palestinian 
National Council and the Executive Committee of the PLO. He was also a member of the 
Central Committee of the PFLP, and a member of its Politburo. Yamani died in 2011.  
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1. In Mandatory Palestine 
YAMANI’S EARLY LIFE 
Ahmad Husayn abu Maher al Yamani was born to a peasant family in Suhmata, 
an Upper Galilee village in the Acre district, in 1924. He was one of ten children, and the 
oldest son. His father’s name was Husayn Ahmad Muhamad ‘Ali Sulayman, and his 
mother’s was Sa’ida al Hajj ‘abd al Rahim Qadura. It was his grandfather who had 
acquired the nickname “al Yamani,” from when he returned from his service in the 
Ottoman Army in Yemen, which he passed on to his descendants. Ahmad’s father used to 
work for the proprietors of the village and surrounding towns and was treated by his 
employers with respect.16 
 The family home conveyed the family’s modest means: its walls were made of 
stone and its roof of thick, rugged wood, filled with twigs, and topped with dirt, which 
they had to replenish each year to keep water from leaking in. The interior was large, 
though, and the roof supported by four stone arches, and the family slept two or three to a 
straw mattress, which they laid out on the stone platform that they cleared to use as a 
living space during the day. (“God bless my mother, she would spend part of the nights 
awake, to keep us covered in our comforters so that we wouldn’t be cold.”17) They had a 
stove, storage for grains and flour and oil, and a wooden trunk for clothes. The two 
windows had no panes. Yamani’s mother used to collect wood every morning with the 
other women in the village to fuel the stove and cooking fire. The property included a 
chicken coop, a stable for the livestock, and a lavatory. Yamani’s secondary school 
teacher paid the family a visit from ‘Akka one year; the teenager was embarrassed that 
                                                
16 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:31. 
17 Ibid., 1:33. 
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his family didn’t own any chairs, so he directed his teacher to his uncle’s instead. Still, 
the teacher insisted on visiting the family home, and they sat together on the mattresses 
without pretention. Yamani called it a lesson in humility. 18 
When Yamani was six, his father took him to Acre to watch an execution. The 
British authorities had sentenced three Palestinians to death for leading the 1929 Western 
Wall (Buraq) riots. Yamani witnessed them climb onto their chairs, then fall and hang by 
their nooses; the crowd in the prison courtyard swelled and protested. 
THE 1930S: ACCELERATED TRANSFORMATIONS TO PALESTINIAN ARAB SOCIETY 
The multi-city riots manifested an explosion of Arab disaffection with Zionist 
immigration and land purchases, which Arabs recognized as a threat to their political 
aspirations and economic future.19 The trigger came in August 1929, when the right-wing 
Zionist youth group Betar raised the Jewish flag at the wall and sang an anthem at the 
Western Wall of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The next day, a Muslim countermarch 
to the Wall devolved into violence, and in the ensuing week, rioters killed 133 Jews and 
British police, deputized civilians, and Jewish gangs killed 110 Arabs. Violence was 
recorded throughout the country, in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, Jaffa, and Nablus.20 
One of the riot’s distant consequences was the coalescence of a secular, 
nationalist movement that challenged Palestinian political institutions that were seen as 
too compliant with British control. Chief among these was the Supreme Muslim Council. 
The Council derived its authority from its purse, which the British Commissioner filled 
                                                
18 Ibid., 1:64. 
19 A note about terms: Though the Arabs indigenous to Palestine describe themselves as of Palestine, many 
refer to themselves as Arabs, for example the Arab Higher Committee. Others refer to themselves as 
Palestinian Arabs, for example the Palestinian Arab Workers Society. Exile caused the Palestinian 
identifier to gain importance, though Arab Nationalists still referred to themselves as Arabs or as 
Palestinian Arabs. As much as possible, I try to respect these self-identifications, which shift between 
Chapters 1 and 2. I hope that I have clarified when necessary. 
20 Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 64. 
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with the considerable revenue derived from the various Muslim endowments throughout 
the country. To this, the Commissioner supplemented income from his Treasury. Never 
in Ottoman history had a local religious authority commanded such fiscal power 
throughout Palestine and therefore dominated civic and political institutions. In fact, the 
Council itself had no precedent – it was fabricated by the British at the start of the 
Mandate and led by a similarly made up institution, the Grand Mufti of Palestine. The 
British appointed Hajj Amin al Husayni to the post, a curious choice: despite his title, 
Hajj Amin was not a particularly pious man, nor was he on good terms with the British. 
A Mandate court had forced his exiled to Syria in 1920 for inciting crowds at the Nabi 
Musa riots in Jerusalem that year, which protested the Balfour Declaration. He moreover 
participated in the 1919 Pan-Syrian Congress that demanded independence from France 
and Britain, supported King Faysal’s short reign in Damascus, and aligned himself with 
Arab Nationalists. But Husayni belonged to a notable Jerusalem family that was 
accustomed to holding prestigious posts such as those of the city’s Grand Mufti and 
Mayor, and colonial officials believed that by pardoning his 1920 sentence and elevating 
him, they could make him beholden to their interests. They were right, and the Supreme 
Muslim Council, which very much owed its position to British favor, offered just token 
resistance against the Mandate and Zionist immigration.21  
The main counterbalance to the Supreme Muslim Council in the 1920s was the 
Arab Executive, which had formed out of the Palestine Arab Congresses of the many, 
local Muslim-Christian Associations. Though the Associations had been formed 
independent of British control, this alternative political structure too came to be co-opted 
by the Mandate administration, which played the notable families of Jerusalem against 
                                                
21 On the political institutions of the Palestinian notables, their establishment, and their relationship to the 
British authorities: Khalidi, Iron Cage, 55–64; Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 30–43.   
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each other. At the head of the Arab Executive sat Musa Kazim al Husayni, a relative of 
Hajj Amin and the former mayor of Jerusalem. The British had replaced him in his city 
post in 1920 with Raghib al Nashashibi, of a rival notable family. Nashashibi led the 
opposition to Husayni in the Congresses and the Arab Executive. The British 
manipulated both politicians, their presses, and the largely powerless Arab Executive 
through favoritism, disbursement, proscription, and censorship. 
The 1929 riots, though, vitalized a new vein of opposition to challenge the 
Mandate, led by the politically engaged contingent of the Young Men’s Muslim 
Associations (YMMA) who came to identify as the Istiqlalists (“Independentists”).22 In 
truth, there was a great deal of overlap between this emerging cohort of leaders and the 
political class of the Arab Executive and the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), many of 
whom were caught up in the heady promise of King Faysal’s 1918-20 Damascus 
government.23 What distinguished them from the leading politicians of the Supreme 
                                                
22 The YMMA was a young organization and had declared itself apolitical in 1928 to attract civil servants, 
whose livelihoods depended on the Mandate. A Salafi institution in the tradition of Jamal al Din al Afghani, 
its mission was to resist the proselytizing mission of the Young Men’s Christian Association and European 
domination more generally. But in the months of political activity and demonstrations following the riots a 
schism appeared between the civil servants and the YMMA’s more ideological leaders, who could not 
separate Zionist immigration from the terms of the Mandate and thus agitated for independence. The 
British ordered the Jaffa branch of the YMMA to close and arrested its outspoken, anti-Mandate leader, 
Hamdi al Husayni (not related to the Jerusalem Husayni family). The Gaza branch closed, as well, unable 
to resolve its internal fracture. The Association resolved to limit itself to sports and cultural activities at its 
1930 Palestine general conference, under threat from Mandate administration. The riots and heightened 
British repression had fractured and enfeebled the YMMA, but the events also confirmed anti-Mandate 
convictions and drove the Association’s more ideologically inclined leaders to demand independence with 
less restraint. Their convictions were further confirmed in 1931, when the British House of Commons 
affirmed through the MacDonald Letter that Britain would not endeavor to restrict land transfers to Jews or 
immigration, nor would it oppose Labour Zionism’s “Hebrew Labor” initiative to secure jobs for Jews and 
close them off to Arabs. See: Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 64–68 & 84. 
 
23 Among the men who went to Damascus to work for Faysal’s administration or participate in the Syrian 
Congress or lead the pan-Syrian al Fatat party were: Hajj Amin al Husayni; ‘Awni ‘Abd al Hadi, who 
became secretary of the Arab Executive; Subhi al Khadra’, who represented Safad in the Arab Executive 
and served Hajj Amin’s administration at the SMC; ‘Izzat Darwazah, who directed the influential Salafi Al 
Najah school in Nablus, wrote an Arab Nationalist history textbook with Sati’ al Husari’s help, and served 
on the administration of the SMC; Mu’in al Madi, who represented Haifa in the Arab Executive; ‘Ajaj 
 19 
Muslim Council and the Arab Executive, however, was their urgency and resolve. In the 
aftermath of the harsh British crackdown, the Istiqlalists took to the press and various 
Congresses to reject the politics of conciliation, in favor of adopting the more stridently 
nationalist rhetoric of Mahatma Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation Movement in India and 
independence movements in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. They also reached audiences through 
schools. At ‘Izzat Darwazah’s influential, Al Najah Salafi school in Nablus, for instance, 
Akram Zu’aytir taught his students about Gandhi and civil disobedience; teachers 
politicized curriculums in Haifa, Gaza, and Jaffa, as well. And they organized rallies and 
filled their newspapers with anti-Notables and anti-Mandate invective. In August 1931, 
police wounded three nationalist demonstrators and sentenced thirty among 1,500-strong 
crowd of men and women in Nablus. Zu’aytir wrote in an editorial, “Pro-government 
notables! Drink tea! But remember, it is tea mixed with blood!” 24 
Weldon C. Matthews identifies the genesis of mass politics in Mandatory 
Palestine within this era:  
By autumn 1931, it was clear that the nationalist message resonated most strongly 
among educated youth and secondary school students. To speak of shaping public 
opinion through the press is to refer particularly to these young men, as well as to 
a small but increasingly politicized group of women. Although the educated youth 
comprised a narrow segment of the Palestinian population, they read, contributed 
                                                                                                                                            
Nuwayhid, who served on the administration of the SMC; and Shaykh ‘Izz al Din al Qassam, who tried to 
organize an armed revolt and whose death in a shoot-out with the British police ultimately inspired one. 
‘Abd al Hadi, Khadra’, Darwazah, Madi, and Nuwayhid all served on the leadership committee of the 
1930s Istiqlal Party, the manifestation of the current that emerged from the YMMA. Qassam was not a 
formal member of the party, but a close associate of it. Many of these men figured prominently in the 
Palestine YMMA network, along with Hamdi al Husayni, who was mentioned above and who also led the 
Istiqlal party, and Akram Zu’aytir, another important Istiqlal leader. Zu’aytir was a product of Darwazah’s 
Al Najah institution, and he edited and contributed to several influential Palestinian newspapers in the 
1930s. He was too young to serve in Faysal’s Damascus administration. Biographical information from 
Matthews, Confronting an Empire. Appendix 2 (pp. 265-73) contains short profiles of the Istiqlal leaders. 
On the members of the SMC administration: p. 79. On Darwazah consulting al Husari: p. 54. 
 
24 Quote from Ibid., 94. On favoring a non-cooperation movement in Palestine: Ibid., 96 & 174. On Al 
Najah school: Ibid., 101 & 120. 
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to newspapers and were aware that the world of their generation was being 
organized into independent nation-states.25 
The decade saw the emergence of “a public sphere that was sustained by schools, 
specialized public spaces, a periodical press, and a telecommunications infrastructure,” 
and “new associations, including athletic, scouting, and labour and women’s 
organizations.”26 The riots had spawned not just a new cohort of leaders to oppose the 
Mandate, but sparked a transformation in political engagement and association, as well. 
The Istiqlal Party lost its luster in 1933, owing in part to an affair reflected in 
Yamani’s memoirs. News emerged that year that the Jewish Agency had acquired a large 
tract of land in Wadi al Huwarith that had been put to sale by its absentee owners, the 
Arab Tayyan family. British police evicted 67 families from the land, exemplifying how 
transfers like this one eroded peasant welfare and their political power.27 Yamani’s 
schoolteachers directed their students in demonstrations and protest, as they did often to 
mark events of nationalist consequence.28 The British High Commissioner and the SMC 
tried very hard to discredit leading Istiqlalists by connecting them to the Wadi al 
Huwarith, with some success.29  
Resent towards the Mandate continued to swell, channeled through schools, the 
press, budding Nationalist societies, a revived YMMA, and unions and other 
associations. General strikes in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, and Haifa in October 1933 
                                                
25 Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 99. 
26 Matthews, Confronting an Empire, pp. 6 and 7, respectively. 
27 Between 1918 and 1936, private landowners, churches, foreign companies, and the government had sold 
168 thousand acres of Arab-owned land to Jews. Absentee landlords had sold 53 percent of the acreage; 
large, resident owners 25 percent; and peasants 9 percent. By 1948, absentee landlords had sold an 
additional 25 thousand acres. The reasons for the sales are varied, but the result – uncontested, large-scale 
land transfer to the Yishuv – deepened a cleavage between peasants and powerless national movements. 
(Essaid, Zionism and Land Tenure in Mandate Palestine, 107–119. Figures from p. 116.) Land transfers 
were concentrated along the fertile coast, moreover, “so gradually the fellaheen were pushed back into the 
less fertile, less watered, more difficult mountainous areas.” (Sayigh, Palestinians, 26.) 
28 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:75–78. 
29 Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 188–93. 
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marked “the intrusion of peasants and wage labourers into the domain of the political 
classes.”30 These actors were motivated by a confluence of economic factors and 
government policies that impoverished them especially, including collapsing agricultural 
prices due to the global depression, regressive tax collection, ongoing land transfers, 
rising immigration (the Fifth Aliyah) in the flight from Nazism, and the absence of any 
adequate social safety net. Unlike the previous Aliyahs, the fifth brought considerable 
capital, which drew villagers to the cities to work as wage labor, though many would 
adopt a pattern of urban-rural migration, connecting the centers with the periphery. 
Between this and the wave of immigration and unresponsive government, the cost of 
living in cities soared while standards deteriorated, and tenements and shanties 
proliferated. There was, moreover, antagonism between Jews and Arabs over wages, 
exacerbated by the Histadrut’s early 1930s “Hebrew Labor” plans; this Jewish union 
went so far as to organize Arab workers into the Palestine Labor League so they would 
demand higher wages and look less employable to businesses and bureaucracies, but 
without much success. Records show that the government implemented an unequal wage 
scale for its public works projects that paid Jews more than Arabs, by multiples. 
Palestine’s iconic citrus industry did not benefit peasants much either; quite the opposite, 
in fact, as growing the capital-intensive crop required considerable investment to become 
profitable.31 The strikes of 1933 turned violent in Nablus, Haifa, and especially Jaffa, 
where police killed 23 demonstrators.32  
It was in the context of this era that Yamani witnessed at least two instances of 
injustice perpetrated against his family and village. Once, while Yamani was watching 
                                                
30 Ibid., 224. 
31 Ibid., 199–206. 
32 Ibid., 214–18. 
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him plow, a handful of British officers stopped his father and beat him with the yoke of 
the animals. They then arrested him without telling Yamani the charges. When his father 
returned home, unexpectedly, a few days later, he told the family that they were being 
punished for providing aid to Palestinian revolutionaries. Another time, the police came 
Suhmata under orders to search the village for weapons and other clues of resistance. 
They ordered all the households to leave their doors open and to gather at the village 
center, and they warned they would burn down any home that didn’t comply. As officers 
went through the homes, they singled out a man and threw him in a body of water. He 
pleaded that he could not swim, but to no avail: they let him drown.33  
In 1935, Yamani’s father sold the family’s only cow to purchase a first World 
War rifle, after the charismatic Haifa Shaykh ‘Izz al Din al Qassam died in a firefight 
with the British police.34 Qassam’s clandestine Black Hand militia numbered 200-800 
men. By speaking passionately against the Mandate and leading the armed resistance by 
example, Qassam had captured the public imagination. Thousands attended his funeral in 
Haifa, and his martyrdom motivated a formidable, countrywide general strike from April-
October 1936. 
This one was different from the one of 1933, which the national leaders of the 
Arab Executive, the SMC, and the fading Istiqlal Party could claim to lead. This strike 
was organized instead in pockets, by autonomously operating societies, including local 
YMMAs, the Haifa Palestine Arab Workers’ Society, and the Jaffa Arab Workers’ 
Society.35 Still, the political class tried to co-opt the action by establishing an umbrella 
                                                
33 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:74. 
34 When the national leadership called off the General Strike of 1936, the mayor of Suhmata urged his 
villagers to surrender their weapons to the British. Yamani’s father hid his rifle, instead; that he would use 
it again in 1948 magnified the symbolism of this act. Ibid., 1:42. 
35 Its decentralized character betrayed the failure of national politics and demonstrated the willingness of 
the population to organize and act on its own terms. In a telling example of how out of touch the national 
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Arab Higher Committee that comprised all the leading parties.36 But if there was any 
hope that the Committee could represent a lasting, unified national leadership it was 
dashed in the strike’s aftermath. The general stoppage, while enduring and inspiring, 
nevertheless inflicted a lot of self-harm to the Arab economy. Nor could the Palestinians 
muster much leverage to negotiate with their Mandate authority; Hitler’s ascent in Europe 
drove an unremitting wave of Jewish emigrants to Palestine in the Fifth Aliya, and the 
populist governments of Egypt and Syria, negotiating their own autonomy from Britain 
and France, respectively, decided, rightly or wrongly, to offer just lip service for the 
Palestinian strike so as not to upset their own negotiations. So, as Yamani recalls hearing 
from his father, the Higher Committee and the Arab governments urged the population to 
call off the stoppage in October and secured promises from the British to renegotiate the 
Mandate. But the more radical strike leaders and the militants in the population suspected 
the Higher Committee’s integrity, and their fears were confirmed in July 1937, when the 
British Government published the unilateral recommendations of Lord Peel Commission: 
partition. By October, armed revolt had erupted across the whole country. It had no 
centralized leadership and the bulk of the militants were peasants and laborers and other 
economically marginalized members of Palestinian Arab society.37 “British forces lost 
control of much of the countryside to armed bands and were briefly forced to withdraw 
                                                                                                                                            
leaders were from their constituents, the limp Istiqlal party had tried to initiate a general strike in February, 
at the height of the citrus harvest season. Naturally, workers did not heed its call, and they instead struck in 
April with their corporatist interest groups, after the harvest season had ended.  
36 “The Higher Arab Committee (HAC), which represented a kind of alliance between traditional notables 
and emergent middle-class urban radicals, took over the leadership of the strike and articulated its 
demands.” (Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, xix.) Twenty-eight out of thirty-two of the AHC delegates 
belonged to landowning aristocracy or to the wealthy merchant class, or were bourgeois professionals. No 
peasants or workers were on the Committee. Sayigh, Palestinians, 48. 
37 “At this point, the rebellion’s peasant and lower-class character crystallized, as the rebel command 
imposed subaltern dress codes on urban residents, declared a moratorium on debts, banned the use of 
electricity, canceled rents on apartments, and extracted large ‘contributions’ from the wealthy classes, 
many of whom fled the country.” Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt, xx. 
 24 
from several of the major cities, including the Old City of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Acre, Jericho, 
and [Beersheva]. The less accessible and more rugged areas of the countryside escaped 
British control for a longer time.”38  
The consequences of the Great Revolt, as it was known, cannot be understated. It 
took two years for Britain to quell it, through a strategy of battle, repression, and 
negotiation. After signing the Munich Agreement with Nazi Germany in September 
1938, the Mandatory power committed ten thousand troops to an intensive military 
campaign in Palestine that laid waste to crops, cattle, property, and lives. It imposed 
harsh, martial law in the territory it reconquered, and imprisoned, expelled, and executed 
militants and anyone Britain believed supported them. The events upended the Arab 
leadership and left the population without any sort of national direction. Five thousand 
Palestinians died, and another 10,000 were wounded; more than one in ten men were 
killed, wounded, imprisoned, or exiled. Those who remained endured severe repression. 
From this point on, the population sorted into narrow, shared interest associations instead 
of into a broader, political movement. Meanwhile, the Yishuv economy expanded thanks 
to the Arab boycott, and its members acquired valuable military experience. The coming 
1947-8 War would predictably end in disaster for the Palestinian Arabs.39 
EDUCATION AND ADULTHOOD 
Yamani turned fifteen in 1939 and was still a student. His parents were illiterate, 
and committed to educating their oldest son. Yamani’s first lessons were with a shaykh, 
who taught him how to read from the Qur’an, but Suhmata’s school principal, who was 
from Safad, advised Yamani’s father to broaden the child’s studies, and the family 
enrolled Yamani in the town. Suhmata’s school was founded in 1886. It offered primary 
                                                
38 Khalidi, Iron Cage, 107. 
39 On the Great Revolt, see: Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt; Khalidi, Iron Cage, 105–24. 
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education and had a garden, where students learned to grow crops, raise poultry and 
rabbits, keep bees, care for a farm. The principal met regularly with the parents, and 
Yamani remembers that national school administrators esteemed him for his 
resourcefulness and commitment. I wonder about the veracity Yamani’s account, 
considering it dates from his early youth, but in any case he adopted a similar 
pedagogical approach as a principal in exile, adding practical lessons to the UNRWA 
school curriculum and involving parents in school administration. The only other school 
in Suhmata was an agricultural one, established during the Mandate period, so when 
Yamani finished his courses in the village, he attended the primary school in Tarshiha. 
He also took English lessons in the summer. Yamani attended school in Safad for his 
secondary education, then Acre, then the Arab College in Jerusalem. The many transfers 
tested Yamani’s family’s resources, but at least in this way he was introduced to students 
from other parts of Palestine, and one of his close friends in the Arab College was from 
distant Majdal, the site of present-day Ashkelon.40  
This peregrination was necessitated by the scarce supply of schools for Arabs in 
Palestine, and though new ones opened in the villages during the mandate, they were still 
too few and underfunded, and the curriculum was of a very low quality. Only 277 of the 
country’s 780 villages had schools in 1932; this proportion grew to 432 out of 800 in 
1945. But the cost of construction had fallen overwhelming on the villagers themselves, 
as the Mandate government had only funded five new Arab schools in the whole of the 
country between 1918 and 1945. Moreover, many of the schools, like Yamani’s in 
Suhmata, did not even offer a full complement of the elementary grades.41 Yamani’s 
scholastic experience was very much the archetype of village education in Mandate 
                                                
40 His education: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:45–72. Date of Suhmata school’s establishment, Ibid., 1:84. 
41 Statistics from Miller, Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 98, 102, 152.  
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Palestine. British policy aimed to keep villagers in the countryside and reinforce rural 
norms (effectively reducing them to stereotypes), so curriculums focused narrowly on 
practical, agricultural education at the exclusion of other technical training and the liberal 
arts, and some schools like Yamani’s school kept gardens and livestock to serve this 
priority. Qualified teachers were put off by low salaries and the prospect of 
impoverished, village living – a concern not at all allayed by deep, British neglect. By the 
late 1930s, the Colonial Office recognized that the system produced substandard 
bureaucrats, and the 1937 Peel Commission warned that the policy was alienating the 
Arabs. Khalil Totah, the headmaster of the Ramallah Friends’ Boys’ School, told the 
commission, “It would seem that Arab education is either designed to reconcile Arab 
people to this policy [of the Jewish National Home] or to make the education so 
colourless as to make it harmless, and not endanger the carrying out of this policy of the 
Government,” comparing it to the provision of Jewish education. Already in 1932 the 
High Commissioner knew that the Arabs were referring to it jeeringly as siyasat al tajhil 
– the policy of making ignorant. Villagers recognized education as a ladder for social 
mobility, and like Yamani many students migrated to the cities in its pursuit. Villages did 
what they could to open new schools and attract qualified teachers, and leaders applied 
unwavering pressure on the government for improvements.42 
There were many times when poverty threatened or complicated Yamani’s 
studies. He received word of his acceptance to the Arab College with joy, then distress, 
knowing he could not afford the books or attire that the College required. But his teacher 
in Akka sent him off with a parting gift: the books his courses would require, a suitcase 
of clothes, and five pounds. In Jerusalem, a friend gave him a college jacket, and another 
                                                
42 On education in the villages, see Ibid., 90–118 & 151–55. Quote from p. 96. 
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taught him to tie a necktie. These experiences, too, would inform Yamani’s priorities as a 
principal in exile, and he demanded insistently that UNRWA provide more financial 
support to Palestinian students. 
Yamani’s first jobs were in the service of the Mandate administration. He worked 
for a year as a bureaucrat at the Bureau of Agriculture in Acre and then was lured away to 
the Bureau of Public Works in Haifa for a higher position and better salary. Yamani’s 
coworkers were Arab and Jewish, and he noticed that Jews commanded better salaries 
and held most of the higher positions. He also suspected that they were stealing resources 
for the Jewish civil engineering firm Solel Boneh and was tasked by the German deputy 
administrator of the Haifa Bureau, Julian Viblotch, to investigate. Yamani collected 
evidence and Viblotch submitted a report with the accusations, but the central 
administration refused to act on it, and Viblotch was assassinated shortly after.43 
The events led Yamani to seek out the Palestinian Arab Workers’ Society 
(PAWS), and he offered to organize the Arabs at the Public Works Bureau. After he 
organized one hundred of his coworkers, the Society sanctioned the establishment of a 
union. The workers learned quickly, though, that they could multiply their influence at 
the Jerusalem headquarters by organizing all of the Public Works Arab workers in 
Palestine, so they established new branches and elected Yamani to serve as the 
syndicate’s leader, its secretary. Before long, Yamani had quit his job and worked full-
time, for less pay, for PAWS Haifa. He supervised four unions of workers of the Public 
Works Bureau, the Survey Department, the Municipality, and the port.44  
                                                
43 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:104–8. I believe the events took place in 1943-4, if I assume that Yamani graduated 
from the Arab College at age 18 (1942) and worked for a year in the Bureau of Agriculture in Acre. 
44 Ibid., 1:116–9 & 122.  
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The PAWS operated as an umbrella organization for a variety of professional 
syndicates and company labor unions. Some of its initiatives were for the general benefit 
of its membership, such as purchasing or contracting housing in bulk and renting or 
reselling it at reasonable prices, operating an employment bureau, extending credit and 
financing savings, and operating a consolidated depot to rent and sell tools. The Society 
also sponsored cooperatives for artisans and contractors to control prices, regulate market 
entry, and bargain collectively on behalf of their independently operating members: these 
included the cooperatives of the lamb butchers, port container operators, welders, and 
tailors of Haifa.45 Its general roles in strikes and negotiations were to liaise between 
workers and employers and to lock out scabs and strikebreakers, in order to protect 
workers from retaliation and to secure the maximum possible concessions. 
For example, when the Haifa port workers – who were contracted as day laborers 
– decided to demand steady employment, they quietly requested the PAWS to negotiate 
with the port authority on their behalf, so that the lead organizers would not have to 
reveal themselves and jeopardize their employment. Yamani, now working full-time for 
the Society, presented their demands to the port administration but was rebuffed, so he 
invited the leaders to the Society headquarters to organize a strike in secret. They planned 
to have workers walk out after the day shift, while the Society would refuse entry to the 
night shift and to any scabs, and they would maintain the stoppage until the port relented. 
Unfortunately, the port authority found out the plan and on the appointed day locked 
some of the day workers into a warehouse. Yamani, though, still had his ID card from his 
Public Works Bureau employment, and he gained access to the warehouse under false 
pretenses. He confronted the shift foreman, also an Arab Palestinian, and loudly berated 
                                                
45 Ibid., 1:111–6. 
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him for betraying the workers, which provoked them to push through the doors and leave. 
This won him an audience with the port’s Arab Palestinian deputy administrator and 
British chief administrator, Arthur Kirby, and he negotiated as an interim solution to have 
the port immediately pay higher wages, provide new uniforms, reduce shift lengths from 
twelve hours to eight, recognize the workers’ union, and promise to address the 
remaining demands promptly. The workers accepted the offer and resumed work, though 
they took revenge on the foreman who had kept them in. They beat him so badly, he 
spent three weeks in recovery, and the new union’s administration donated twenty-five 
pounds to offset some of his hospital expenses.46 
THE PALESTINIAN ARAB WORKERS’ SOCIETY 
Yamani had entered the workforce around 1943, and conditions were ripe for 
labor activism in the wartime economy. Demand for labor was high, but rocketing 
inflation was driving down real wages – by one calculation, the cost of living index 
nearly tripled between 1939 and 1945.47  The PAWS was the most powerful Arab 
workers’ society of Palestine, but it was by no means the only one; its chief rivals to 
represent the Arabs came from the left, in the form of the Federation of Arab Trade 
Unions and Labor Societies and the Arab Workers’ Congress. Both were the intellectual 
associates and heirs of the Palestine Communist Party and, unlike the PAWS, showed a 
willingness to coordinate strikes with the Zionist Histadrut union to strengthen their 
bargaining positions. (The distinction between the FATULS and the AWC blurred after 
the war).48 The gulf between the Leftists and the PAWS was at times pronounced. In its 
                                                
46 Ibid., 1:142–6. This incident must have occurred between 1944 and 1945, before Yamani transferred to 
the PAWS Jaffa office. Kirby also managed the Palestine Railways until the partition. 
47 Lockman, Comrades and Enemies, 268. 
48 FATULS and the AWC were not Zionist sympathizers, though – they called for the establishment of a 
unified, Arab, democratic state across all of Palestine, which would recognize Jews as a minority but treat 
them as equals. To paraphrase David Ben-Gurion: The Palestinian Arab Left (Marxists, ex-Marxists, and 
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efforts to marginalize the Histadrut, which for nearly two decades had been trying to 
organize Arab workers within its own framework, the PAWS would sometimes ask 
Arabs to refrain from striking with Jewish coworkers, or would settle for quick 
negotiations in the hopes of winning the favor of the Mandate administration. Whatever 
the political merits of this strategy, it opened the PAWS to criticism that it sold out the 
Arab laborer for the national cause. Critics complained its leadership was high-handed 
and doctrinaire, and that its leader, Sami Taha, was conservative and in thrall to the 
discredited and largely exiled Arab Higher Committee political elite.49  
This rift over anti-Zionist strategy has riven Palestinian politics from the Mandate 
era to the present, and Yamani’s memoirs should be read in this light. Should Palestinians 
(and Arabs, in a larger sense) seek salvation through class struggle or unity and the pan-
Arab nation? How exclusive are the associations by class and nation? Can Palestinians 
disassociate Judaism from Zionism in the context of their anti-imperial and class 
struggles? Who are the allies of Palestinians masses and who is figuring to subjugate and 
exploit them? The Nakba appeared to Yamani to have vindicated the PAWS and Arab 
Nationalist strategy to subordinate class struggle to the national cause. That the 
Palestinian and Lebanese Communists endorsed the 1947 UN Partition resolution, in line 
with the Soviet Union’s vote, further confirmed it. But the Palestinian political 
leadership, to which Yamani belonged practically his entire adult life, continued to 
wrestle with these questions. Were Arab Nationalists Nasser’s lackeys, were they too 
doctrinaire, and were they wrong to entrust Palestine to the pan-Arab cause?50 Was the 
                                                                                                                                            
Socialists) fought labor exploitation as if there were no Zionism and Zionism as if there were no labor 
exploitation.  
49 Lockman, Comrades and Enemies, chap. 7–8. 
50 I discuss this criticism of Arab Nationalism in Chapter 3. See also Turki, The Disinherited. Turki grew 
up in the Lebanese refugee camps and was a partisan of the pan-Syrian movement. 
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armed struggle too unprincipled, and did it neglect governance and welfare and the class 
struggle? Did the PLO sacrifice the refugees outside of Palestine for those inside it, and 
self-determination for empty statehood?51 
In Yamani’s admiring profile of Taha, the PAWS leader, he evokes the reverence 
of a young man for his mentor. That is, in defending Taha’s leadership, Yamani defends 
his own; in defending Taha’s political philosophy, he defends the foundations of his own; 
in defending the compromises and sacrifices Taha made for his cause (remaining in 
Palestine), he defends those he made for his own (returning home). Taha was born in 
1915, in Jenin, but his father moved the family to Haifa to find work while he was still a 
child. When he died, Taha dropped out of school to support his mother. He spent his 
whole career in the employ of the PAWS, joining as a messenger and ascending to the 
position of General Secretary in 1946. When the port administration of the strike 
described above refused to negotiate with Yamani on account of his apparent youth, Taha 
obliged them with a visit, but only to say that Yamani enjoyed the full confidence of the 
workers, and then walked out. In the few years he worked for Taha, Yamani observed 
him meld civic organization with national defense and subordinate labor activism to 
patriotic duty.52 
Yamani used to notice a regular stream of figures gathering in Taha’s office, 
behind closed doors. His curiosity got the best of him and he asked Taha about the goings 
on – the financial statements made it clear that these were not anonymous financiers. 
Taha confessed that they were trying to form a nationalist association to defend Palestine. 
                                                
51 These criticisms have been developed by any number of authors. For example: Khalidi, Iron Cage, chap. 
5–6; Sayigh, Armed Struggle, vii–xvii, 663–92. 
52 Yamani profiles Taha’s life: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:126–41. 
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Yamani would later collaborate with many of these men to rebuild civil society in exile. 
They included Ahmad al Shukayri, ‘Amir al Khalil, and Ziab al Fahum.53 
Taha reached the height of his renown in 1947 when, as a member of the Arab 
delegation to the London roundtables on the resolution of Palestine, he faced down the 
British Foreign Minister, Aneuran Bevan, and delivered a stirring speech that denounced 
Britain for colonizing Palestine and facilitating Zionism. Jamal al Husayni, the head of 
the Arab Higher Committee at the time, had led the delegation. When Taha returned to 
Palestine, he organized an 11th hour political effort to resist partition, announcing at the 
PAWS third general conference in August that the Society would reject the cleavage and 
support instead a democratic, Arab Palestinian state. Taha affirmed that some Jews in 
Palestine did in fact have their roots in the land and said that the future Arab Palestinian 
state should offer citizenship to those who had resided there since 1918.  He also called 
for the Arab League and other Arab states to purchase lands in Palestine to prevent 
further transfers to the Yishuv.  
In hindsight, such an initiative seems pitiable, but someone took it seriously, and 
Taha was assassinated in September that year. Yamani originally suspected that it was the 
British or the Zionists who ordered the hit to weaken the Arab leadership, but he came to 
believe the Arab Higher Committee did it, to warn others from bypassing the institution. 
This was a reasonable suspicion; Taha wasn’t the first of the Husaynis’ political 
opponents to suffer so.54 The assassination sparked large demonstrations in Haifa and 
Jaffa, and the Society struggled to appoint a new general secretary.55 It did not really 
                                                
53 On the secretive nationalist meetings, Ibid., 1:152–3. 
54 Khalidi writes that al Husayni convinced the 1939 Arab delegation to London to reject the White Paper, 
partly by threat of assassination. (Iron Cage, 117.) 
55 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:136–41. The Arab Higher Committee nominated Ya’qub al Husayni to the post, but 
the Society declined and offered it to Ahmad al Shukayri, who later led the PLO, instead. Shukayri 
declined, though, and the Society settled on ‘Amir al Khalil, a Nationalist leader who had been part of the 
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matter much, though, because the United Nations resolved to partition Palestine six 
weeks later, and the Society fragmented in the ensuing violence. 
By this time, Yamani had moved to Jaffa to serve as the secretary of the PAWS 
branch there after the Society’s leftists split to form its own Conference of Arab Workers 
in 1945. They had taken with them the Jaffa, Gaza, Jerusalem, and Nazareth offices.56 
Coinciding with the final period before Partition, Yamani’s activities in Jaffa revolved 
increasingly around national defense. In one instance, Yamani arranged a steel theft to 
benefit an Arab militia, the Ajnadayn Brigade, that would join the Arab Liberation Army 
in the coming war. Public Works Bureau drivers had informed Yamani that they had been 
transporting the material to a Zionist settlement, under orders, where it was being used to 
make armored vehicles. Yamani relayed the information to the military wing of Jaffa’s 
Nationalist Committee, but it asked Yamani to have the drivers transport the steel directly 
to their offices. So Yamani contacted Michele Issa of the Ajnadayn Brigade, instead, and 
they worked out a plan to “ambush” the convoy – with the foreknowledge of the drivers. 
The theater allowed the drivers to feign ignorance to their employer.57 Then, after the 
ratification of the partition resolution, Yamani joined the city’s Nationalist Committee as 
the representative of the Arab laborers to coordinate supplies, armament, and resistance.58 
Yamani’s final year in Palestine resembled that of the hundreds of thousands of 
Arabs who lived in the territory that would become Israel, marked by displacement and 
                                                                                                                                            
Arab delegation to London in 1947. He was also a doctor and had managed the Society’s health services 
and insurance. The general suspicion for the murder was cast on the Arab Higher Committee, according to 
Lockman (Comrades and Enemies, 342). On Taha’s speech in London, see: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:134–5. 
56 On the split: Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World, 187. The leftists were unhappy with the Society’s 
nationalist (as opposed to class) orientation and its willingness to compromise on labor issues. See also: 
Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:148–9. Yamani says the PAWS was composed of three currents: the Arab 
Nationalists, who constituted the majority; the Pan-Syrians; and the Communists.  
57 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:151. This was of course not the first time Arab Palestinians had discovered that the 
Mandate administration was supplying Zionists for war; such revelations had bred distrust towards the 
British throughout the ’30s. Matthews, Confronting an Empire, 5. 
58 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 1:156–7. 
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terror. The PAWS summoned Yamani back to Haifa as Jaffa descended into chaos. There 
he secured the organization’s documents and delivered them for safekeeping to a 
delegation of the Lebanese Red Cross in Acre. Then he returned to Suhmata, where he 
joined the village’s coordinating committee and the regional committee for the Galilee. 
They attempted to maintain basic civil services, and they strengthened connections to 
Lebanon after the Zionists took Acre. Yamani’s father urged him to flee with the family 
to safety in Lebanon, promising to return when hostilities would subside. Yamani 
refused, stayed with a guerrilla cell of three, and waited for the Israeli army to arrive. 
They were arrested and kept in prison until early 1949.59 
                                                
59 Ibid., 1:157–209. See also: Sayigh, Palestinians, 86. Yamani is quoted under the initials “R.M.” 
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2. Reconnecting in Exile  
INTRODUCTION – THE NAKBA – CONDITIONS OF EXILE 
Though nakba (translated as “the disaster” or “the catastrophe”) connotes a 
moment resolving instantaneously in time, Palestinian refugees experienced the process 
of displacement as a years-long ordeal. Many fled from the advancing Zionist front in 
1948, propelled by terror, bombardment, and reliable reports of rapes and massacres. 
Their first priority was to move out of harm’s way; some left immediately across the 
borders to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, or Egypt, while others relocated to relative safety 
nearby, only to be forced to move again not long after. Those who remained in their 
locations in spite of the approaching Zionists – and many families fractured apart in 
decisions to flee or remain – were liable to be forcibly expelled across the border. Thus, 
even before reaching a neighboring country, many Palestinians had moved multiple 
times, displaced from one vulnerable location to another or searching for family members 
now scattered apart. There are accounts of parents searching among the displaced for 
their children, who were separated from them in the chaos.60 By 1949, 131,155 
Palestinians had been displaced to Lebanon, according to UNRWA. Most had come from 
Haifa, Akka, and the Upper Galilee, though a few had come from as far south as Jaffa.61 
Displacement did not end at the border, either. The Lebanese state had not 
prepared for this refugee crisis; as a result, diaspora through the country unfolded in an 
assortment of ways, and for many Palestinians families it would be years if not a decade 
until their circumstances stabilized. The country’s initial response was coordinated by the 
League of Red Cross Societies and supplemented by government support and the UN 
                                                
60 Sayigh, Palestinians, 81–92. 
61 ʻAli ̄, al-ʻUmma ̄l al-Filast ̣i ̄ni ̄yu ̄n wa-masa ̄r al-h ̣arakah al-niqa ̄bi ̄yah, 15. 
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Relief for Palestinian Refugees. But the refugees had fled their homes with minimal 
provisions, and the scale of need overwhelmed the uncoordinated response. Relying on 
their own, limited resources and on the charity of individual Lebanese and local and 
national charities, most refugees headed for the coastal cities looking for work. Many 
settled in tents, warehouses, or other shelters, or they rented cramped quarters to share 
with other families.62 
The state’s laissez-faire market orientation and Maronite-controlled executive 
facilitated some Palestinians in their recovery. At first, there were very few restrictions 
on employment, and foreign capital was always welcome so long as businesses employed 
three Lebanese for every foreigner. The middle-class found gainful employment, and 
professionals resumed their practices. The state granted Christians among them 
citizenship at first; Muslims of moderate means could also obtain the privilege by paying 
lawyers and proving Lebanese ancestry.63 
The privilege turned out to be a very valuable one, because the 1950s saw the 
government institute a system of regulations restricting Palestinian behavior. In 1951, 
Interior Minister Emile Lahoud stipulated that the government should treat Palestinians 
as it does all other foreigners, that is, according to the principle of reciprocation. This 
meant that the government would grant privileges to foreigners as foreign governments 
granted them to Lebanese expatriates. Of course, the idea was fraudulent, as there was no 
Palestinian state to grant privileges to Lebanese, but that was the point. Subsequent 
rulings deprived Palestinians of access to social security and disability insurance (though 
they were required to pay into it), limited the number of licenses available to them and 
                                                
62 Sayigh, Palestinians, 103–7. 
63 On Lebanese policy favoring Christian and professional and wealthy refugees: Sayigh, Too Many 
Enemies, 22–26. 
 37 
made them prohibitively expensive, and curtailed their rights to participate in unions or 
unionize.64 Property ownership and travel permissions were restricted, too. Casual labor 
jobs remained available to Palestinians, but they earned exceedingly little for their toil: 17 
times less than Palestinians in “regular employment” and 33 times less than those who 
operated a private business.65 Meanwhile, UNRWA subsidies never exceeded 20 cents 
per person per day.66 Moreover, bureaucrats exploited the vulnerable Palestinians, as 
Rosemary Sayigh describes: 
The absence of a clear code regulating Palestinian rights and duties allowed the 
state to operate a ‘politics of convenience’, using the Palestinians’ need for vital 
documents (mainly work permits and travel documents) as a means of exercising 
political pressure, or individual extortion. The supply of work permits also 
responded to fluctuations in the Lebanese economy’s labour needs. Departments 
of the state that dealt with refugees – mainly the ministries of the interior, labor 
and foreign affairs – could issue their own decrees, enabling officials to exploit 
refugee needs for their own ends. Rules, procedures and fees were constantly 
changed, producing a situation of confusion and dependence on wasta 
(connections, bribes).67 
The mass of the underserved refugees – those coming from rural Palestine and 
from poor, urban origins in particular – saw their conditions deteriorate from dire to 
impossible. For them, the “UNRWA-managed camps played a basic role in the economic 
survival of the refugees, especially in the first decade of low wages and limited 
employment.”68 Camps provided rent-free shelter, basic rations, water and waste 
facilities, clinics, and schools, and UNRWA employed Palestinians to provide the various 
                                                
64 Mundus (in Sayigh, Palestinians, 140, fn. 47 & 49) calculated that it usually cost 32-37 LL – one to 
three weeks of a laborer’s income – plus at least one missed day at work for a Palestinian to obtain a work 
permit. Only one office in the country issued them, in Beirut. Officials would also extort Palestinians for 
bribes. In 1969, only 2,362 out of approximately 100,000 Palestinian workers held a valid permit. On work 
restrictions and the onerous permit system, see: ʻAli ̄, al-ʻUmma ̄l al-Filast ̣i ̄ni ̄yu ̄n wa-masa ̄r al-h ̣arakah al-
niqa ̄bi ̄yah, 34–40. On exclusion from social security and union membership, see: Ibid., 13–15. 
65 Sayigh, Palestinians, 115. 
66 Ibid., 113. 
67 Sayigh, Too Many Enemies, 24. 
68 Ibid., 23. 
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services – Yamani moved to Ghoro, near Ba’albeck, to take a position as a teacher. Some 
families that could afford to rent their own accommodations at first soon found 
themselves forced to move to the camps. The camps also afforded the vulnerable refugees 
security in numbers, and their proximities to the coastal cities promised relative 
opportunity and income, as compared to the impoverished south and the Beka’. Many 
Palestinians migrated from one to the other in search of schooling and work. By 1952, 
one-third of refugees were living in a UNRWA shelter.69 
 
 
Table 1. UNRWA Camps: Establishment, Surface and Population (1993)70 
                                                
69 Sayigh, Palestinians, 114–9.Statistic from Peteet, Landscape, 108. 
70 Source: Abbas et al., “The Socio-Economic Conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon,” 379. 
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The authorities preferred to consolidate the refugees into camps, too71. Relief 
agencies recommended it as a best practice measure to efficiently distribute aid, and they 
incorporated one refugee camp in 1948 and six more in 1949 (see Table 1). The 
government, prefiguring its policy towards displaced Syrians today, wanted especially to 
move the impoverished refugees away from cities, as a way to undermine their potential 
political influence. This proved to be a prescient move; Palestinians increasingly engaged 
in strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations in the 50s and 60s, to assert their identities and 
existence, and to demand better treatment from employers, the government, and 
UNRWA. Moreover, consolidated populations are easier to police, as the president’s 
Deuxieme Bureau would prove through its backbreaking vigilance of the camps in the 
1960s; Yamani’s memoirs speak to the Bureau’s unforgiving surveillance. Camp 
settlement effectively amounted to marginalization, away from public sight and political 
participation. In this way, the state undermined, or at least erected barriers to, cooperation 
between Palestinians and marginalized Lebanese, whose interests overlapped. Politicians 
played on popular perceptions of peasants and the poor as miscreants; the Beirut 
mercantile elite, in particular, did not want glamorous image of their capital tarnished. 
Out of sight, out of mind.72 
Yet, the refugee population amounted to an abundant labor force desperate for 
income. While the state tried to push refugees out of the cities, especially Beirut, the 
productivity of the urban economies pulled them back. Employers, especially in 
manufacturing, construction, and agriculture, too, preferred to have refugees nearby. The 
Mkalles industrial zone, east of Beirut, drew thousands of refugees to settle in Dbayah, 
                                                
71 On the location of the camps, see Sayigh, Too Many Enemies, 22–26 & 34–45.  
72 On state repression, see Sayigh, Palestinians, 130–36. On Beirut politics, see Kassir, Beirut, 349–58, 
427–36.  
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Qarantina, Burj Hammud, Tal al Za’tar, and Jisr al Basha. Similarly, refugee settlements 
in Shatila and Burj al Barajnah, both south of Beirut, grew at exponential rates; not only 
did Palestinians hope to find work in an agglomerating market, they recognized the value 
of security in numbers, and once settled near Beirut, they’d send for their families and 
fellow villagers to join.73 
The camp locations reflected these various tensions: Relief agencies wanted to 
concentrate the refugees, the state wanted to isolate them and push them out of the cities, 
the refugees wanted to work, and employers wanted cheap labor nearby. So, the camps 
concentrated around the zones between urban and rural. All of the Beirut area camps 
except for Mar Elias formed in the city’s suburbs, accessible to both factories and farms; 
the capital’s growth has swallowed their sites into what is its metropolitan area today, 
though. Burj al Shimali and ‘Ain al Hilwah lie not far outside of Tyre and Sidon, 
respectively, and serve those two cities’ agricultural regions. Nahr al Barid was placed 20 
kilometers from Tripoli, in the North. Security forces also directed Palestinians to 
Rashidiyah and al Bass camps, both near Tyre and both already homes to existing 
Armenian refugee populations, and to Camp Wavell, a military barracks outside of 
Ba’albek vacated by the French at the end of the Mandate. 
For years, security forces and refugees tangled over where the latter could live. In 
Tripoli, refugees living in warehouses in the port resisted a police eviction order to Nahr 
al Barid camp outside the city. A fight ensued, and the police had to call reinforcements 
to finally execute the order.74 In Beirut, the government denied water and electricity in a 
                                                
73 Mundus, Al-ʻAmal Wa-Al-ʻummāl Fī Al-Mukhayyam Al-Filast ̣īnī is a meticulous account of the 
conditions of Tel al Za’tar camp and the work behaviors of its inhabitants. Kassir (Beirut, 347–436) 
documents the capital’s post-war boom, swelled by the outcome of the Nakba, which closed the border to 
Palestine and removed the port of Haifa from the Arab market. 
74 Sayigh, Palestinians, 107. 
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protracted but ultimately failed bid to discourage refugees from settling the periphery. 
Authorities were especially keen to move refugees out of the South, away from the 
border with Israel.75 In Tyre, they put families, including Yamani’s, on trains and 
dispersed them throughout the country. Some were sent to the Bekaa, but winter was so 
bitter there and food so scarce, that they went on strike, and the government transferred 
them again, this time to Nahr al Barid. Later, in 1956, authorities transferred a contingent 
of remaining Bekaa Palestinians back to the south, to Burj al Shimali, because conflict 
had erupted between them and the Armenian refugees who had settled ‘Anjar, a town in 
the east, decades prior.76 Neglect fueled further migration. While the state had allowed 
fifteen camps to incorporate by 1956, it permitted no further after that, nor did it allow 
any to grow in area. Shantytowns (Beirut’s “belt of misery,” especially)77 absorbed who 
the formal camps could not support. Families moved especially to Beirut to enroll their 
children in secondary or higher education. Authorities tried to force migrants to return by 
requiring refugees to pick up monthly rations and relief from their places of registration. 
This chapter and the next are an account of how Yamani, on an individual level 
and on behalf of Palestinians in general, weathered the manifestations of powerlessness, 
chief among them endless insecurity and relocation. His first response was to work for 
sorely needed income, but he soon left his job and returned, hopeful, to Palestine. After it 
became clear that he would not be able help the PAWS rebuild, he returned to Lebanon. 
He found some stability in teaching and school administration, and he worked with 
                                                
75 A Nabatiyah camp resident told Peteet: “In 1955, the government decided that there were too many 
smugglers between Palestine and Lebanon and that it could affect the security situation – military 
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similarly positioned Palestinians to strengthen the institutions that nourished refugee 
society and gradually captured political power. 
YAMANI – SETTLING IN LEBANON – ORGANIZING IN THE WEST BANK 
 Abu Maher al Yamani entered Lebanon on foot in early 1949. After a period of 
captivity in Israeli jail, Yamani was driven to the border with a few other prisoners and 
released with a warning. “The soldiers will shoot whoever turns back. Don’t try to return, 
or you will be killed,” his captors said. The men walked to the border village of Rmeish, 
south of Bint Jbeil, in the Nabatieh province. They were received kindly by the residents, 
who comforted them and gave them food and a place to rest.78 
Yamani planned to travel to Tyre the next day to search for his family, but was 
astonished to see his maternal uncle in Rmeish in the morning, who was passing by the 
village to sell his horse to support his family, which had settled in exile in Nabatieh. In 
Nabatieh, Yamani learned from his relatives that his family had settled near the docks of 
Tripoli, and he set off for the northern city in a shared van with the few liras his uncle 
gave him. He found his family in what had become the refugee quarter; their joy of 
reuniting can hardly be described. 
Yamani’s family had settled in a certain Ahmad Mir’ai’s warehouse in the port. 
Ten families shared the space, each separated from the other by a curtain of bed sheets. 
Yamani’s family had also crossed into Lebanon through Rmeish, but then turned to Tyre 
as authorities had directed thousands of entering refugees. They settled temporarily in a 
camp and received rations and blankets from the Red Cross and clothes donated by the 
city’s residents, before boarding a train at the orders of the camp authorities to relocate 
north, to Syria. But the Syrian government had closed its borders to further refugees from 
                                                
78 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 2:5–15. 
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Lebanon, and they disembarked at Tripoli instead.79 Yamani’s father went to the Red 
Cross there and obtained from them a letter acknowledging Abu Maher’s prisoner of war 
status in Palestine, stating he had been arrested on January 8, 1948. Not a few days before 
Yamani caught up with the family in Tripoli, his father had departed for Palestine to find 
his son. He traversed the country by night and hid from Israeli police during the day and 
met secretly with some former associates, but after failing to find out anything about Abu 
Maher, he returned to Tripoli two weeks later. Of course, he was overcome with emotion 
to see his son again. 
Yamani found work to support the family as an accountant in a chemical factory, 
but he did not stay in Tripoli for long. A friend of his in the port had just been in Kuwait 
looking for work, where he met Hosni Salah al Khafash, a companion of Yamani’s in the 
PAWS and the former director of its Nazareth and Nablus branches. Al Khafash asked 
the friend to deliver a message to Yamani, inviting Yamani to join him in Nablus to 
revive the PAWS branches in the West Bank. Yamani didn’t indicate much hesitation 
about accepting the proposition; he wrote in his memoirs, “Our friendship was bound by 
our service to the working class.”80 On October 8, 1949, Yamani left his job and his 
salary of 20 Lebanese Liras (LL)81 per week and returned to Palestine. 
Yamani would spend about a year organizing workers in the West Bank. There, 
he learned from the example of the Jordanian state, which had assumed control over the 
territory, that the Arab regimes could be just as intransigent towards the demands of the 
working class as the Mandate governments, if not more so. Yamani also discovered the 
                                                
79 The family probably experienced further displacement. It is likely that soldiers forced them to move 
again in 1957, to Baddawi camp. Peteet writes that a property owner had ordered the eviction of 19 families 
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firmness of his ties from his union days. At every step along his journey to Palestine and 
across the West Bank, he was met by the hospitality and encouragement of his former 
associates. He rested in Damascus with Burhan Sarih, a coworker from PAWS – Haifa, 
and met with ‘Abd al Hamid abu Faris Hamir, one of the earliest leaders of the Society.82 
Yamani stayed with another PAWS associate, from Tarshiha, in Irbid, and in Amman, he 
met with ‘Amir ‘al Khalil, who served as the interim president of PAWS after Sami Taha 
was assassinated. As he had managed with Yamani, Khafash enticed PAWS leaders from 
across the Diaspora to return to Nablus to reconstitute the Society’s Administrative 
Committee and coordinate the activities of the remaining branches in the West Bank, 
especially Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jenin, and Tulkarm. 83 
It wasn’t long before the Administrative Committee attracted the attention of the 
Jordanian security services. In Nablus, the PAWS tried to organize a sit-in at the Khalifa 
al Mikanikiyah factory after management terminated a worker who had tried to organize 
his colleagues into a union. Jordanian security forces forced the workers out, however, 
and arrested the Khalifa organizer, and exiled Khafash to the isolated East Bank town of 
Shobak. Demonstrators took to the streets. Yamani thought he could appeal with the 
provincial governor, whom he knew when he was a judge in Haifa, but the governor 
stonewalled him. When Yamani reminded him of the compassion he’d shown to workers 
as a judge, the governor replied coolly that they were no longer in Haifa. The labor action 
had failed, and now the intelligence services started to follow PAWS activities with 
interest: an agent was attending all of their public meetings, and it appeared that the 
                                                
82 ‘Abd al Hamid abu Faris Hamir, whom Yamani met in Damascus, deserves mention, not for his role in 
this story, which is insignificant, but because his biography is also a transnational history. Abu Faris led 
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83 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 2:16–27. 
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services had a mole in the Administrative Committee. Not long after, an officer 
summoned Yamani to the intelligence bureau and informed him that he would be placed 
under a strict curfew and forbidden to leave Nablus. The PAWS leadership decided that 
the restrictions on Yamani were too severe and urged him to return to Lebanon, where he 
could do more good. Dejected, Yamani obliged.84 
Yamani would return to Palestine 14 years later to attend a conference of the 
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, held in Gaza. By this time, Khafash 
had transformed PAWS into the General Union for Palestinian Workers, and the 
Confederation declared that Arab workers would be the vanguard to secure Palestine’s 
return. Khafash would ask Yamani to establish a branch of the General Union in 
Lebanon, marking his reentry into the organization he had revived in Nablus years 
earlier.85 But when Yamani returned to Lebanon in 1950, he had no foreknowledge of 
this future. His chapter in Palestine had come to an end.  
UNRWA SCHOOLS PRINCIPAL – GHORO (BA’ALBEK) AND ‘AIN AL HILWAH (SIDON) 
Returning to Tripoli, Yamani found work as a primary school Arabic and 
arithmetic teacher at the College of Education. Again, he had found support from his 
former associates from Palestine: it was Muhammad Khayr Bahlul, who directed a 
cultural club in Jaffa and who sat with Yamani on the National Committee in Jaffa, who 
connected Yamani with the position. Bahlul was also exiled in Tripoli and teaching at the 
College. But Yamani only stayed for a semester. He applied to teach in the UNRWA 
school system and, in January 1951, he moved to the Biqa’ Valley to begin his 
                                                
84 On this attempt to revive the PAWS in the West Bank and Jordan: Brand, Palestinians in the Arab 
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succeeded it in function.  
85 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 3:115–9. 
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appointment as the Principal of the Ghoro Barracks school, near Ba’albeck. His salary 
was 150 liras per month.86 
Yamani took to elevate the roles of the school and principal beyond their official 
capacities. Recognizing that the school was a nexus of camp society, Yamani arranged a 
Parents Association that would concern itself with general camp issues as well as school 
matters. In coordination with the Association, Yamani would postpone classes to allow 
students to join their parents in demonstrations, some ideological, proclaiming a national 
character, and some practical, demanding better services from UNRWA. Yamani would 
also transcribe residents’ petitions and present them to administrators. Inside the school, 
Yamani had his teachers give supplementary lessons on Palestinian history and 
geography and lead sports and scouting activities. He also arranged classes for illiterate 
adults and an overnight summer camp for 80 students. No doubt, Yamani’s ambitious 
agenda was facilitated by his familiarity with the refugees: many of the residents of 
Ghoro, he happily discovered, had hailed from his own Sahmata, and he knew several 
teachers from home. Moreover, he was already acquainted with the UNRWA Education 
Administrator for the Biqa’ Valley, who used to lead the Tiberias branch of PAWS. 
Visiting, foreign UNRWA administrators did not seem too happy with Yamani’s 
initiative, however, and sent the head of the UNRWA Education Department, Ernestine 
al Ghori, to investigate. But Ghori herself was Palestinian, and Yamani spoke his case 
plainly to her. She returned to Beirut and promoted him to Principal of the much larger 
‘Ain al Hilwah school, near Sidon, the following year. She noted the commendable test 
scores coming out of Ghoro.  
                                                
86 On his tenure at the College of Education: Ibid., 2:46. On his tenure at Ghoro school: Ibid., 2:47–57. 
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But at ‘Ain al Hilwah, as at Ghoro, Yamani’s initiatives extended beyond 
improving scores. An examination of Yamani’s leadership as ‘Ain al Hilwah school 
principal reveals how Palestinians in camps endeavored to improve their circumstances 
and assert a vitalized sense of patriotism.87 
In the summer of 1952, before his first year at ‘Ain al Hilwah, Yamani attended a 
teacher training course organized by UNRWA and UNESCO for their staff in Syria and 
Lebanon. The attendees could use the guidance – like Yamani, many of UNRWA’s 
Palestinian teachers came from a different professional background. Yet, the official 
purpose of the course seems ancillary to its function of bringing scattered leaders 
together. One hundred and fifty teachers attended this course, and one hundred had 
attended a similar course the year prior. “These two courses strengthened the ties been 
the teachers in Syria and Lebanon. The teachers would exchange notes on methods, 
circumstances, and management.”88 These relationships had consequence. Privately, the 
teachers organized an informal network to collaborate among themselves in Lebanon and 
selected Yamani to maintain correspondence with Subhi abu al N’aj, who represented an 
analogous association in Syria. Three years later, the two groups of teachers coordinated 
strikes against the UNRWA administrations of both countries.  
When Yamani arrived at ‘Ain al Hilwah, there was only one school for nearly 
1,000 students, and it offered no secondary-level classes and no classes on Palestinian 
history and geography. He set about to overcome both deficiencies in his first year. 
Drawing on the connections he had made through the training courses, Yamani 
coordinated with the principals of the Ghoro, Ta’albaya, Beirut, Tyre and Nahr al Barid 
                                                
87 On his tenure at ‘Ain al Hilwah School: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 2:57–69. On educational access for 
Palestinians in Lebanon and the role of schools in building a national consciousness, see Peteet, Landscape, 
50–91. 
88 On the UNRWA teacher training courses: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 2:74–7. Quote from p. 77. 
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schools to write and distribute texts on Palestinian history and geography. This would 
motivate UNRWA to finally incorporate a similar text into the official curriculum. The 
principals also coordinated to distribute a uniform Palestinian oath for students and scouts 
to recite across Lebanon at the beginning of each day.89 For his students who passed the 
primary-level baccalaureate exam, Yamani arranged the school’s first secondary-level 
classes, and he invited graduates of the nearby Mieh Mieh camp school to attend, as well. 
For books, Yamani sent a delegation to Beirut with 1,000 LL to purchase them 
secondhand; the money had been collected by camp residents in three days, and presented 
to him as a surprise. UNRWA gave sanction the new classes and, two years later, opened 
secondary school in ‘Ain al Hilwah. Yamani also established the camp’s first library and 
concentrated its collection on Palestine. 
As at Ghoro, Yamani believed that physical conditioning was an integral part of 
growth and education. He organized gym classes, sports teams, and tournaments, and he 
arranged to play matches at the Sidon Municipal stadium and to have UNRWA award 
official certificates. Teams would also travel to other camps to compete with students 
there. These arrangements, along with public rallies and commemorations, were 
important rejections of the state’s attempts to isolate the peasant and poor refugees. 
The commemorations elevated ‘Ain al Hilwah’s position as a hub of Palestinian 
activity in the Sidon area. Refugees from Mieh Mieh and Sidon and towns all around 
would descend on ‘Ain al Hilwah for important anniversaries – the Nakba, the partition 
of Palestine, and the Battle of Hittin. Yamani drew on scouts to invigorate the memorials 
through rallies and chants, and though public demonstrations could not leave the gates of 
the camp (the Lebanese security forces forbade it), refugees came to attend. Yamani’s 
                                                
89 Yamani claims to have written the oath; I cannot be sure, but, in any case, a search on Google indicates it 
has fallen out of use. Only a couple of obscure social network pages list the lyrics. Yamani transcribes them 
in Ibid., 2:61.  
 49 
commemoration of the Battle of Hittin, in particular resonated with the refugees, most of 
who had come from the Galilee and some even from the village of Hittin itself, which 
was depopulated in 1948. The Battle has been mythologized by Arab Nationalists as a 
symbol of Arab unity that dates back to the 12th century. In it, Salah al Din led a force 
from Damascus that included a brigade of men from Mosul – who had come to aid their 
Arab brethren – to reconquer Hittin from the Crusaders and expel them from Palestine. In 
school, students recited commemorations of the Battle. On another occasion, they 
performed a play to a mixed, Lebanese and Palestinian audience about the treachery of 
the Balfour Agreement and Britain’s deceit. These memorials instilled pride and hope in 
the traumatized, bitter, and disinherited refugees. 
Yamani was one of many likeminded men who undertook such initiatives. Farj 
Mu’ad, the principal of the Nahr al Barid camp school, might have been his closest 
associate. Mu’ad had organized the first Palestinian teachers associations in Tripoli, the 
Biqa’, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre. He and Yamani both believed that unions, schools, and 
scouts could be vehicles for nation building and return. During this period, while Yamani 
was principal of the ‘Ain al Hilwah school, he and Mu’ad approached Ziab al Fahum, the 
Inspector General for the UNRWA Education Department, with the idea to expand the 
scouting movement beyond the schools and open it up to all young men. Fahum was a 
Palestinian, older than Yamani. He had fought the British mandate tenaciously in the 
1936 revolt and was consequently exiled to Iraq. There, he took up arms as a partisan of 
Prime Minister Rashid ‘Ali al Gaylani against the monarchy propped up by Britain. He 
returned to Palestine to fight partition and the Zionist militias, and he was ultimately 
exiled to Lebanon, where, like Yamani, he decided to pursue resistance through civic 
leadership. Yamani seemed to trust Fahum absolutely for support in the Agency 
administration. Fahum appointed one of his aides to assist Mu’ad and Yamani, and he 
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connected them with ‘Atif Nurallah, the former head of the Scouts of Haifa. Nurallah, in 
turn, connected them with the Lebanese scouts al Kashaf al Muslim and al Kashaf al 
Jarah, which supplied the growing ranks of Palestinian scouts with equipment and 
books.90 
The scouts became the nuclei of mass mobilization in the camps and the 
vanguards of the armed struggle under the direction of the UNRWA principals; they 
symbolized the nation. Pictures show them, young men and women and boys and girls, 
marching in formation through stadiums and singing anthems to assembled audiences. 
Some of the lyrics were, “We are the Force of Revenge (Fawj al Tha’r) and the Heroes of 
Sacrifice (Abtal al ‘Awda) / We ask for revenge, we don’t seek riches/ Our concern is 
recovering glory and the nation.”91 They also represented Palestine at Arab scouting 
retreats. In 1956, they drilled in Alexandria, and Nasser gave them a rousing speech, 
having nationalized the Suez Canal shortly before. They hoisted slogans on flags and 
tucked under their arms thick sticks that mimicked rifles; they wore matching uniforms 
and kept tight poses. They trained in military exercises, too. Yamani and other principals 
collected dues through the Military Organization for the Liberation of Palestine, a 
clandestine association,92 to purchase pistols, machine guns, and ammunition, and men 
who used to be police officers in Palestine led the scouts on hikes into the mountains and 
taught them the fundamentals of combat and wilderness survival skills.  
The principals organized a scouting confederation, al Kashaf al ‘Arabi al Filastini, 
to coordinate activities across Lebanon. On important anniversaries, teachers would hike 
with contingents of young men to the border and lead commemorations there. These 
                                                
90 On the scouts: Ibid., 3:238–42. Scout activities also described in the ‘Ain al Hilwah pages: Ibid., 2:57–
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91 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 2:259. 
92 Discussed in Chapter 3 
 51 
small brigades took the name Tala’i’ al ‘awda (“The Vanguards of Return”). Al Kashaf 
al Muslim and al Kashaf al Jarah joined them, as well, fixing bonds between the 
Lebanese Muslim left and the Palestinians that would endure especially in times of civil 
warfare. Principals also sent scouting delegations to other camps, where the young men 
would overnight and meet families from parts of Palestine strange to them. Palestinians 
had settled in Lebanon largely in clusters with their former neighbors – cohabitants of 
their villages from Palestine, or their hometowns, or their former city neighborhoods. The 
exchanges broke this insularity, and scouts and students maintained these new, if distant, 
relationships through correspondence.  
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Figure 2. Top: al Kashaf al ‘Arabi al Filastini (scouts) drilling in Alexandria. Bottom: 
Yamani standing with scout leaders.93  
Scouting activities were not just constructive, though; they diminished the 
position of the hometown as a place of identification and chipped away at pre-Nakba 
social hierarchies. In their places, scouting instilled patriotism and contributed to an 
                                                
93 Source: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 2:258. No date, but presumed from the text to be from 1956. 
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ongoing social transformation of the peasant, laboring, and petit bourgeois classes that 
had begun in Palestine. What was happening, in essence, was the entrenchment of the 
state paradigm, whereby Palestinians learned to look to national unity for strength, and to 
administrators for leadership. In Mandatory Palestine, a form of proto-state had emerged 
from schools, factories, unions and the government bureaucracy; these were the 
institutions that had proven most adept at responding to the period’s pressures. Exile 
further favored the state paradigm, partly because the UNRWA administration mimicked 
a Palestinian government bureaucracy and because the Lebanese state operated as just 
that, and partly because the leaders of the proto-state institutions in Mandatory Palestine, 
who had emerged from the Nakba with their reputations intact, were naturally inclined to 
resurrect these institutions in exile. Scouting, in the eyes of the civic leaders, was a 
response the difficult conditions of exile – exclusion, exploitation, powerlessness, 
indignity, and isolation – that was viable within the framework of the existing institutions 
– camps, UNRWA administration, the Lebanese state, Lebanese civil society, and the 
growing sense of patriotism. Simultaneously, scouting continued the social 
transformation that entrenched the proto-state, Palestinian nationalism, and the authority 
of the administrators turned civic leaders, such as Yamani, Mu’ad, and Fahum. 
In May 1953, Hajj Amin al Husayni scheduled a surprise visit to ‘Ain al Hilwah 
school, which Yamani arranged with just a day’s notice. By Yamani’s account, the Hajj 
had desired to meet with camp representatives in Sidon to avoid any possible 
disturbances that would smear his tour’s publicity, but Yamani assured him that a camp 
audience would be on good behavior. He gathered teachers, parents, and camp 
representatives to the school’s courtyard and announced the identity of their visitor just 
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before his arrival. The audience was elated: “They jumped up and cheered.”94 Al 
Husayni’s visit was brief, but the hosts managed to deliver a few short speeches to him 
on their activities, their resolve, and the condition of the camps; the Hajj made some 
remarks in return and promised that the Arab Higher Committee would represent the 
camp to the Lebanese authorities. A short while later, a delegation of the Higher 
Committee returned to praise Yamani for the arrangements and offered perpetual 
financial support to the Kashaf al ‘Arabi al Filastini in exchange for folding the scouting 
movement into the Committee’s aegis. Yamani declined, and no support was given. 
Afterwards, according to Yamani, the Higher Committee tried to obstruct the activities of 
the Palestinian scouting movement and the Shabaab al ‘Arabi al Filastini in Lebanon, and 
al Shabaab waged a media campaign alleging that the Committee neglected the concerns 
of Palestinians and hoarded donations meant for refugees. 
The British had forced Husayni out of Palestine during the Great Revolt, and he 
watched the Nakba from exile. But his ego and opportunism did not diminish one bit, and 
he reprised his role as the self-interested intermediary. After 1948, Husayni bounced 
between Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, and Amman, concerned with keeping the Arab Higher 
Committee in the good graces of the new, post-independence political elite, and through 
favoritism he jealously guarded what nominal recognition and authority UNRWA and the 
Arab governments had granted him. In Lebanon, into the 1960s, the Higher Committee 
served patronage through permits, funds, and UNRWA job appointments, and it shielded 
its clients from the Lebanese security forces. Chief among them were the former notables 
and village leaders, who owed their continuing influence in the camps in part to the 
Committee. But the variables of exile were too great for the Higher Committee to control 
                                                
94 Ibid., 2:294. 
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and, as the above example shows, a new model of civic leadership resisted its influence. 
At the state level, Arab governments – Nasser’s especially – played off the rival leaders 
of the All Palestine Government and the PLO against Husayni. With the submission of 
the PLO to Fatah and the popular, armed struggle, the marginalization of Husayni and the 
Committee was complete.95 
Meanwhile, the residents of Nahr al Barid were innovating an umbrella institution 
to manage the camp: the popular committee. Popular committees were mechanisms of 
self-rule that represented each camp as a unit, coordinated services, mediated conflicts, 
interfaced with UNRWA, and organized rallies in coordination with the scouts, Teachers 
Associations, and workers associations. The popular committees of the Sahrawi camps in 
Algeria, for example, afford refugees some autonomy from the state. “Sahrawi refugees 
take charge of their lives, camp organization, and the distribution of aid… This enables 
the Polisario [the dominant political representation of the Sahrawis] to act as a buffer 
against direct intervention and the hegemony of international aid institutions.”96 
Similarly, the committees in Lebanon enabled the Palestinian leadership to mediate 
between the directives of the authorities and the realities among the refugees.97 At the 
same time, we can think of the committees as a mechanism by which the civic leaders 
extended and entrenched its authority among the refugees. Careful not to rouse the 
vexation of UNRWA, a clandestine network of civic leaders quietly implemented the 
administrative design among other camps and Palestinian concentrations. From Nahr al 
Barid, for example, they had popular committee member Shaykh ‘Ali Sa’id al Qadri, a 
marriage official who could visit other Palestinian agglomerations without drawing the 
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97 Discussed later, under Arab Nationalist Movement in Chapter 3. 
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suspicion of the authorities, travel to Baddawi and help organize a Committee there. In 
this way, they replicated the civic structure and formalized their leadership across 
Lebanon. Under Yamani’s direction a decade later, the committees would lose their 
autonomy to the PLO and the national cause, and would lose some of their sensitivity to 
camp-specific issues. Still, they have survived as mediating institutions within the camps 
until today and constitute one of the popular foundations of the PLO.98  
Yamani requested to transfer from ‘Ain al Hilwah to Burj al Barajneh for the 
1954-5 school year. The reason he gives in his memoir is dubious.99 At the close of the 
previous school year, UNRWA announced it would open a second school in ‘Ain al 
Hilwah. Yamani would remain the principal of the primary school, and one of his 
teachers would lead the new, secondary school. Parents and students were not happy with 
what they perceived was an attempt to marginalize Yamani, and they boycotted the 
schools and demanded that he remain the principal for all students. But Yamani thought 
that the UNRWA plan was sound and counseled the demonstrators so. When he couldn’t 
convince them to end the boycott, he abruptly asked for and received a transfer to Burj al 
Barajneh, rendering the plan fait accompli. I suspect, though, there were ulterior motives 
for Yamani’s request. Why was he so ready to leave ‘Ain al Hilwah, where he had 
enjoyed such success? Perhaps he recognized the advantages of operating in Beirut, 
where he could enjoy closer contact with other civic leaders and expand the initiatives he 
had championed: the scouts, of course, and the student associations, the parents 
associations, the Palestinian history and geography courses, the illiteracy classes, the 
physical education classes, and so forth. Most of all, though, from Burj al Barajneh, 
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Yamani could consolidate the energy of the large but fragmented network of camp 
teachers associations and direct its efforts towards mobilizing the general public and 
articulating clear and direct demands to UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities. 
BURJ AL BARAJNAH (BEIRUT) 
Encouraged by what the UNRWA teachers had accomplished after gathering 
through the training courses, Farj Mu’ad organized to have fifteen of them meet privately 
in Beirut and establish a more formal structure to their network, in 1954. At this point, 
the Association of UNRWA Teachers in Lebanon was formally established, and the 
teachers elected six men to comprise its administrative committee. Their names are worth 
mentioning here, because the Association would remain a forceful advocate for peasant 
and poor Palestinians in Lebanon, organizing civil society in camps, holding UNRWA 
accountable to its promises, arranging rallies, and lending leaders to the various factions 
of the ascendant Palestinian Resistance Movement. They were: Elias Jarayasi, ‘Uthman 
Fa’ur, Ibrahim al Sakhnini, Nathmi al Kan’an, Farj Mu’ad, and Ahmad al Yamani, with 
Yamani elected Secretary and Mu’ad Vice-Secretary. Thereafter, the Association met on 
a roughly semi-monthly basis in Beirut, usually at Café Qasqas in Hamra, and collected 
membership dues of 25 piasters per month. Yamani coordinated their activities from his 
position as Principal in Burj al Barajneh.100 
Official correspondence that Yamani preserved indicates that the Association 
behaved as a union in its dealings with UNRWA.101 In 1955, they engaged with the 
Agency to secure raises and school and camp improvements. An account of this episode 
casts light on the Association’s motivations and tactics, which include careful 
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preparation, strikes, publicity, and negotiations. As a consideration of Yamani’s tenure in 
‘Ain al Hilwah illustrates, camp circumstances did not improve because of some natural 
progression of time, nor out of concessions granted out of the goodness of administrators’ 
hearts; here, too, civic leaders manipulated UNRWA into action, with the primary 
difference between 1955 and the years before it being that the teachers were more 
assertive in their affiliation and demands. This was a natural continuation of the work that 
camp leaders had initiated prior. 
In January 1955, the Association agreed that UNRWA had not made good on 
earlier promises to increase wages and wrote to the General Secretariat of the League of 
Arab States to have them present the matter to the agency. In the letter, the Association 
complained that inadequate wages threatened the quality of education and pointed out 
that UNRWA drivers were paid 250 LL per month plus allowances whereas teachers 
were paid just 200 (this was for the breadwinner of a family of four). We learn that 
UNRWA operated roughly 40 schools and employed 320 teachers at the time, and, if the 
claim is to be believed, that students in UNRWA schools performed, on the whole, better 
on standardized tests than students in state and private schools. The Association also 
agreed to stage a hunger strike in front of UNRWA headquarters. 
At the UNRWA headquarters on the appointed February day of the strike, an 
Agency director received the gathered teachers and principals and passed along their 
demands to officials who were presently gathered to discuss the camps. The Association 
suspended its strike as a gesture of good will. It does not appear that they were satisfied 
with the outcome however, because they escalated their actions and their demands over 
the next few months. 
In March, the Association implied a threat to join with the striking UNRWA 
teachers in Syria, who had received some coverage in the newspapers for their demands 
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for better pay. In April, they confronted a UNRWA director at his home and made clear 
that their patience was running out. They demanded better pay, investment in the schools, 
and formal recognition of their Association. Two weeks later, the Association in Lebanon 
announced its cooperation with its counterpart in Syria and protested the news that 
demonstrating teachers in Damascus were winding up in hospitals. The teachers planned 
to meet privately in early May to plan their next steps, but UNRWA caught wind of it and 
asked the Lebanese government to prohibit the gathering. Perhaps the Agency impressed 
upon the government that the teachers were Arab Nationalists, which the Presidency 
considered a threat to the state. In any case, George Himri, the head of the state’s Central 
Committee for Palestinian Refugee Affairs, summoned Yamani to the Presidential 
Palace, listened to his grievances, promised the state’s cooperation, and requested that he 
call off the Association’s meeting. Yamani refused, and security forces broke up their 
meeting the next day. Himri arranged to mediate a discussion between a handful of 
Association representatives and Mr. Courvoisier, the Director of UNRWA-Lebanon, 
though, and Yamani presented Courvoisier 17 demands.  
The Association’s demands give us a picture of the conditions of UNRWA 
schools and administration in 1955: Class sizes exceeded 40 students; instructors taught 
over 30 class periods per week; breaks did not coincide with those of the state school 
system; teachers faced arbitrary dismissal; teachers were not compensated for moving 
expenses when assigned to another camp; and some of the districts had no UNRWA 
secondary schools. The teachers also demanded that the Agency offer higher salaries, 
ranging from 150 to 320LL ($46-$98) per month plus a family size allowance and family 
health insurance, and they demanded supplies and new books, texts on Palestinian history 
and geography, free education through secondary school for the children of teachers 
continuing education grants for the top teachers, and labs for secondary schools. 
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Within the Association though, members were starting to burnout, and they asked 
Yamani why they should agitate if they’ve been promised raises in July. Yamani 
reminded them that the struggle was a matter of patriotic duty and workers’ pride. “The 
teachers’ cause is not just a material demand; it is a public one that has been present since 
the day the schools opened, and it has no end. For this reason, I again ask all teachers to 
put the interests of their students in front and to work cooperatively to promote the most 
consummate levels of social and educational attainment.”102 It’s unclear how this 
situation was resolved, though, because in June, Yamani was arrested for distributing an 
incendiary pamphlet that accused the UNRWA administration of serving Zionism. 
The document in question, pseudonymously signed by “Al Shabab al ‘Arabi al 
Filastini,” was called “Agent and Agent” (Wikala wa Wikala), and it accused the UN 
Relief and Works Agency of conspiring with the Jewish Agency to complete the partition 
of Palestine. “Just as the Jewish Agency… expelled the Palestinians from their homes, 
we see that the international Agency (Zionist Agency #2) also exiles the Arab 
Palestinians and keeps them out of Palestine,” it said.103 It called Courvoisier a Zionist 
and said his directorship was poisonous and aimed to annihilate any hope of Return. 
Courvoisier complained to Himri – the same state official who would mediate between 
the Teachers Association and UNRWA in May – and the agency and the Interior Ministry 
recruited camp informants to trace the source of the document. They arrested Yamani, 
three students, and a Sidon publisher, and a court sentenced Yamani to a few months in 
prison for publishing illegally. (Palestinians were proscribed from engaging in political 
activity at the time). UNRWA – Courvoisier, specifically – fired him in August.  
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The episode revealed a sliver of Yamani’s clandestine activities. It came out at the 
trial that Yamani had started publishing similar materials when he was assigned to ‘Ain al 
Hilwah. He had distributed over 9,000 copies by mail to other teachers, influential 
figures, leading refugees, and UNRWA’s foreign administrators and its local staff. He 
testified that only he and the three students were involved, but this was at least a half-lie. 
Yamani had been engaged in clandestine publishing activities since he had lived in 
Tripoli. He had penned and distributed numerous pieces to rally workers and refugees, in 
coordination with other similarly ascendant civic leaders, who more often than not shared 
a faith in Arab Nationalism. 
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3. Expanding Organizations 
ASSOCIATING WITH THE ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT – AL THA’R NEWSPAPER 
When Yamani returned to Lebanon after helping Hosni al Khafash to revive the 
PAWS in the West Bank, in 1950, he brought with him a document that he had received 
in Jerusalem from a former notary from Jaffa, ‘Abd al Halim al Yassin. It was a 
manifesto titled “Arab Nationalism: Facts, Clarifications, and Methods.” Yamani 
appreciated it not just for its contents but also because men he had admired had it read 
before him, including Taha, ‘Amir al Khalil, and “other intellectuals.” It is photocopied 
into his memoirs with the note, “I kept this valuable gift of theory with me. It furnished 
the basis of my national consciousness. I thought it beneficial to record the document in 
its entirety as an article of Nationalism that predated the establishment of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement. In my opinion, it remains suitable as a unifying, modern, nahdawi 
project.”104 
The opening lines immediately give us a sense of why Yamani subscribed to Arab 
Nationalist thought: 
Arabism, or the Arab Cause, is what we call the movement the Arabs have 
undertaken to liberate themselves from colonialism and slavery, poverty and 
ignorance, and the other weaknesses. They comprise the powerful, civilized Arab 
Nation and through it they preserve their physical and moral existence, carry their 
cause, and deliver their message to the people and the civilizations of the 
world.105 
Arab Nationalism offered Palestinians deliverance and salvation. Several scholars have 
traced its genealogy of the idea from the late Ottoman period, through the Mandate and 
into exile. In fact, its content is less consequential to this story than the fact that the idea 
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was widely shared. Yamani’s memoirs reveal that camp leaders relied heavily on the 
organizational framework and material support offered by Arab Nationalist associations 
in order to rebuild civil society. By the late 1950s, the Palestinian section of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement (ANM) in Lebanon, which calling itself al Shabab al ‘Arabi al 
Filastini, was directing considerable attention and resources to the camps, from 
coordinating between the various Popular Committees to representing refugees to the 
authorities to arranging to have Nasser’s government supply teachers to a camp school. 
Because of overlapping associations, the leading camp institutions were nearly 
interchangeable – al Shabab, the Teachers Association, the Popular Committees, and the 
scouts – and Arab Nationalism came to undergird important refugee social institutions.   
Back in Tripoli, Yamani turned to some of his old Nationalist acquaintances for 
practical and moral support. Muhamad Khayr Bahlul, who used to direct the Arab 
Nationalist cultural society in Jaffa, set Yamani up with his first teaching job, at the 
Teaching College. Yamani again depended on the man, who had access to the College’s 
printing press, to print pamphlets for his Nationalist organization, the Military 
Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (MOLP). 
The MOLP began as a group of five Tripoli refugees, Yamani among them, who 
met intermittently to share readings, commiserate, and support each other.106 Yamani and 
Fadah had been friends in Palestine and companions in the PAWS in Jaffa. In their first 
meeting, Yamani shared an essay that he’d found while passing his time in a local college 
library. Written in 1935 by the great Syrian Arab Nationalist orator ‘Abd al Rahman al 
Shahbandar, the essay had called for Palestinians to remain steadfast against Zionist 
immigration and refuse to migrate away from the coast and leave the cities and the 
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cultural legacy to the immigrants. “What will you say to the future generations?” it asked. 
“What good will the religion of the Arabs have amounted to, their distinction, their 
knowledge, their glory, and their modernity – what good would all of these amount to if 
you surrendered this eternal and valuable heritage for a dilapidated, provisional, and 
cheap one?”107 The discussions inspired the young men to form the formal association to 
mobilize other Palestinians, reject their circumstances, and return to Palestine.  
Contrary to its name, though, the MOLP didn’t practice violence – they had no 
weapons. The young men thought it would be a good idea for it to sport a menacing label, 
and they sent threatening pamphlets to the League of Arab States and other authorities 
denouncing “reactionary” Arab regimes and the international community’s treachery. At 
the top of the pamphlets sat the logo, a map of Palestine with the slogan “For an Arab 
Palestine, Death Does Not Scare Us,” crossing through the middle. They delighted upon 
finding a picture in a newspaper in 1950 with the caption, “’Azam Basha [head of the 
League of Arab States] shows Ahmad Hilmi Basha [Ahmad Hilmi ‘abd al Baqi, the 
Prime Minister of the All-Palestine Government] a threatening letter he received from the 
Military Organization for the Liberation of Palestine.”108 They read another report that 
the Jordanian government had sent a delegation of intelligence officers to help Lebanon 
track down the MOLP, after the organization had sent Jordanian authorities a letter 
demanding they stop disrupting Palestinian political activity and release all Palestinian 
prisoners. In these early stages of organization, distributing pamphlets and exchanging 
ideas was the sole method of mobilization, and the young men shared their materials at 
their workplaces and expanded their network. Yamani recruited members from the 
Teachers Association in ‘Ain al Hilwah and collected from them small dues to buy 
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weapons, which they provided to the scouts to train them. Occasionally, the MOLP 
members would drill, too. In sum, the Organization didn’t amount to much, except that it 
inspired Palestinian Arab Nationalists in Lebanon to restore their affiliations with one 
another and preserve their Palestinian identity within the Arab Nationalist Movement, a 
broader, more powerful current that would eventually incorporate the members.  
The Arab Nationalist Movement started as al Shabab al Qawmi al ‘Arab, a 
clandestine association of American University of Beirut students who drew inspiration 
from their professor Qustantin Zurayk. Zurayk, like the whole of the Arab world at the 
time, was engaged in a reflection on the state of the region in the wake of the calamitous 
1948 defeat. In the place of the bankrupt regimes that had lost Palestine, and in the place 
of the neglect and imperialism and political fragmentation that retarded Arab society, 
Zurayk hailed the promise of an educated, invigorated youth to realize the total Arab 
potential, cast off empire and Zionism, and build a democratic, popular, progressive, and 
unified Arab nation. “In this process a ‘select elite’ of Arab youth, ‘organized and united 
through political parties and cohesive organizations, committed to a common and pure 
doctrine, and bound by a concrete and true loyalty…’ would play the major role.”109 
Two Palestinians– George Habash and Wadi’ Haddad – and three others formed 
the ANM’s core. Habash and Haddad came from the middle-class families that were 
expelled in the Nakba from Lydda and Safad, respectively. They both studied medicine 
and would graduate in 1951 and 1952.110 The students used to collect donations for 
refugees and deliver them to the camps; it was in this way that Yamani first became 
acquainted with them in 1950, when he was the principal of Ghoro. They invited Yamani 
to speak at their cultural association in Beirut, al ‘Urwa al ‘Wuthqa (The Firmest Bond), 
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and he continued to receive delegations in Ghoro and then in ‘Ain al Hilwah. By the start 
of the 1952 school year, Yamani had become one of the ANM’s principal contacts in the 
refugee camps, and the movement began to finance camp associations and support them 
through its publications and its expanding network of contacts. It was at this time that 
Yamani began to decline donations on behalf of the refugees, concerned that they would 
engender a culture of dependency among the younger generations and inure them to exile 
from Palestine; the ANM responded by donating 500 LL to the ‘Ain al Hilwah scouting 
movement, instead. Shortly after, ‘Adnan Faraj, a junior member, approached Yamani to 
ask for his help to produce and distribute the ANM’s first publication, al Tha’r 
(Revenge). They published the first issue on October 20. Teachers regularly contributed 
expositions on camp conditions and criticisms of UNRWA administration.111  
Al Tha’r found a ready audience among Palestinians. To avoid attracting the 
authorities’ attention to the ANM, they listed a pseudonymous publisher, The Committee 
of Resistance Against Reconciliation with Israel. The content reflected just that. Al Tha’r 
was speaking to the frustrations of camp refugees when it accused authorities of abetting 
the Zionist agenda, and it spit vitriol not just at Israel and Western imperial powers but at 
what it called “reactionary” Arab regimes as well, such as the Hashemite Monarchies of 
Jordan and Iraq and the Saudi Kingdom of Arabia. It was equally caustic towards 
UNRWA, which it accused of acting as an agent of Zionism and pointed to its insensitive 
administration, its appalling services, and its persistent attempts to settle Palestinians in 
exile and normalize relations with Israel as proof. Its message was direct and clear: 
Palestinians would never recognize the legitimacy of the Zionist state, and they would 
accept no outcome but the dissolution of Israel and return. “To reconcile with Israel 
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means to concede that the Jews have a right to our land,” said an article by the title “The 
Dangers of Reconciliation with the Jews.” Another article, titled “The Direct 
Negotiations,” said, “The UN agency’s resolution calling for direct negotiations between 
Arabs and Jews is the logical and inevitable result of its weak engagement with the Arab-
Palestinian issue after the Nakba… Fundamentally, this is about a nation raped and an 
Arab peoples expelled from their homes… but disputes over borders and compensation 
have abandoned the core matter.”112 
Al Tha’r expressed a resentment towards the international community that traced 
back to 1947 United Nations Resolution 181, to partition Palestine. Palestinians were 
deeply skeptical of the international community’s intentions in light of its betrayal, and 
they were further disappointed by its apparent unwillingness to pursue a just resolution. 
“UNRWA itself was born… because of the failure of the United Nations Palestine 
Conciliation Commission to – in the terms of its mandate – ‘facilitate the repatriation and 
rehabilitation of refugees and the payment of compensation.’”113 Al Tha’r articulated the 
implication: the United Nations was pursuing an emollient approach and setting the status 
quo. In this light, all UN initiatives seemed suspect. Al Tha’r vigorously protested 
resettlement and naturalization, reflecting the general consensus among Palestinian 
leaders that such programs aimed to subvert their claims to refugee status and annul their 
right to return. UNRWA’s own mandate – to “rehabilitate” Palestinians and get them to a 
point of self-reliance – did it no favors. Palestinians were acutely aware of the agency’s 
aim to delete them from its rolls, and they rejected its large-scale works projects (the ‘W’ 
in UNRWA), which they recognized as underhanded attempts to integrate the refugees 
into the host countries through binding employment. There’s a story retold so often that 
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its origins have been lost, that refugees used to cut down trees that UNRWA had planted 
in the camps. These were not acts of ingratitude, though, or of cultural backwardness, but 
ones of protest. “If it is something that can be brought home when the refugees repatriate 
(such as literacy, education or training) then it is acceptable. Anything else is resettlement 
by stealth.”114  
UNRWA’s top-down directives and inattentive camp administration further 
alienated the Palestinians. Camp conditions were truly abhorrent. Sewage ran on the 
streets and access to water, gas, and electricity was severely limited. Floods washed away 
possessions, storms blew away tents and tin roofs, and harsh winters killed residents. But 
when UNRWA undertook to make improvements, it did so unilaterally, confirming fears 
of resettlement and abandonment. “The decision was taken in 1953 to replace tents with 
semi-permanent shelters. … Thus the latest of a series of non-decisions resulting in 
refugees remaining in areas where they had initially been accepted as a strictly temporary 
measure, and assistance being provided on an extended relief model with all the 
marginalization and impoverishment that implied.”115 UNRWA moreover stopped 
registering refugees in 1953, despite that new families fell into poverty and despair with 
each year, squeezed out of the Lebanese economy by an ever-tightening system of work 
permits and regulations. The state’s restrictions condemned Palestinians to unprotected 
wage labor, while others enjoyed the dividends of a blossoming Lebanese economy. The 
Palestinians who had registered with UNRWA couldn’t change their residencies, and 
they risked losing their subsidies and registration if they moved – for education, work, 
family, or whatever other reason – whether to another part of the country or to another 
country altogether. State security forces periodically swept the camps to evict those not 
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registered there, and the state and UNRWA coordinated to consolidate refugees and 
displace them from the cities and the southern Border. Camp leaders loudly protested the 
inflexible ration and subsidy distribution regimes, which served as another layer of 
movement restrictions. UNRWA refused to open distribution centers in unofficial 
settlements, and it required refugees to pick up their rations, in person, at their location of 
registration, and at appointed times, saddling them with the additional costs of missing 
work and paying for transportation.116 
Al Tha’r sought to make sense of these many indignities and seeming betrayals. It 
was as though the international community wanted to set the Zionist project, not undo it. 
Every offer of assistance was one-half of a Faustian bargain, requiring Palestinians to 
agree to forfeit their identity in exchange. The paper confirmed to readers the lesson: it 
was up to Palestinians to represent their own interests to the world, and even to UNRWA; 
they could expect no favors from the international community except through struggle.  
Equally importantly, though, Al Tha’r connected the camps. Young cadres were 
compensated with falafel sandwiches for smuggling issues across Lebanon, and weekly 
readership grew from 5,000 to 15,000. Salah Salah, a young Nationalist organizer in ‘Ain 
al Hilwah said of the paper, “It was the most influential and most widely distributed 
voice, and refugees seized copies of it with excitement.”117 
THE ANM AS A CIVIC INSTITUTION 
Existing scholarship on the Arab Nationalist Movement focuses on its political 
leadership, privileging analysis of the movement’s trans-national, pan-Arab activities at 
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the expense of a probe of its leadership among Palestinian civic life in exile.118 Indeed, 
the ANM’s leaders, foremost among them Habash, ensnared the group in the thick of the 
Arab Cold War, field mice in a lion’s den of battle, and after Nasser refused to sign the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955 and nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, the Movement had found 
its Arab Nationalist hero. In 1957, the group agitated against King Husayn in Jordan and 
sabotaged government targets in the capital, with the help of Syrian and Egyptian 
intelligence services. In 1958, it fought along the opposition in Lebanon during that 
country’s brief civil war, dispatching members to fight from Tripoli and Tyre, smuggling 
arms in from Syria, and training with the Syrian-Palestinian 68 Battalion. In 1959, it 
fomented unrest in Iraq against ‘Abd al Karim al Qasim in the lead up to and aftermath of 
the failed rebellion in Mosul; smuggled Egyptian arms to insurrectionists in Oman; and 
resumed sabotage operations in Jordan. Meanwhile, it entangled itself in Syria. 
Enthusiastically supportive of the Nasser-led United Arab Republic, the group could 
count itself among the losers when the Syrian political establishment dissolved the union 
in 1961. In 1962 then a year later, it supported a failed coup then a successful one that 
brought Baathists and Nasserists to power in Damascus but again found itself on the 
wrong side of history shortly after when the Baathists began to consolidate their power: 
the ANM had not endeared itself to the Baath by supporting an abortive military rebellion 
to reunite the UAR.  
Wadi’ Haddad used to tell new ANM recruits that the road to Tel Aviv ran 
through Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, and Cairo,119 but there was an obvious tension 
between its pan-Arab orientation and the leading concern of its predominantly Palestinian 
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rank-and-file, to return to Palestine. “The ANM leadership increasingly faced a difficult 
question: how to reconcile the emphasis on Arab unity with the need for a special focus 
on Palestine, and to what extent should commitment to Nasser prevent independent 
armed struggle against Israel?”120 The weight of this contradiction led Habash and the 
ANM leadership to authorize a Palestine Committee within the movement in 1959. 
Habash and Haddad sat at its head, but the committee included lower-ranking Palestinian 
leaders as well, such as Yamani. They would sometimes operate in Lebanon under the 
name al Shabab al ‘Arabi al Filastini, presumably adopting it from the pseudonym 
Yamani had used to sign his pamphlets. In 1963-4, while Habash was embroiled in 
Syrian affairs, the Palestinians organized themselves into an autonomous branch. It’s not 
clear whether Habash sanctioned this development, but he had no choice on the matter: 
the rank-and-file wanted to prioritize Palestine. Habash preferred a centralized, trans-
national structure to the ANM, but at least the Palestinian branch developed into his own 
command.   
The division over Palestine overlapped with another fissure in the movement, 
over whether the Arab Nationalist agenda could afford to overlook the social and 
economic struggles that divided the pan-Arab polity. On this matter, Habash and Haddad 
preferred the affirmative: they gave the pan-Arab agenda higher priority, in large part 
because it spoke more directly to liberating Palestine. The two men, and Haddad in 
particular, and the bulk of Palestinians in general, simply were not as concerned about 
class struggle as the Movement’s leftists, led by Nayif Hawatmah, himself a Palestinian, 
and Muhsin Ibrahim and Muhamad Kishli, both Lebanese. There were three currents 
running through the ANM, then: the Leftists, led by Ibrahim, Hawatmah, and Kishli; the 
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Nationalists, led by Habash and Haddad; and the Palestine-firsters, led by Haddad and the 
Palestinian leadership in Lebanon, which included Yamani and others.  
But the 1967 defeat exposed the Arab Nationalist slogans as hollow. The Leftists 
were already convinced that they needed to wage a social and economic struggle, and 
Ibrahim and Kishli organized the ANM-Lebanon branch into the Organization of 
Lebanese Socialists and withdrew it from the movement. The Organization would evolve 
once more and become part of the nucleus of the Lebanese National Movement, the 
Leftist coalition of the coming Lebanese civil war. At the same time, Fatah’s easy ability 
to recruit from the refugee camps highlighted the popular appeal of liberating Palestine. 
Habash presided over a merger with the Syrian-supported Palestine Liberation Front to 
form the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), symbolizing the final 
triumph of Palestine-first over the Arab Nationalist agenda. As for Hawatmah, he had 
remained attached to the ANM-Palestine branch and then the PFLP, but in 1968 he led a 
contingent of Leftists to form an offshoot that would become the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). 
In fact, the Arab Nationalist Movement was far more enmeshed in Palestinian 
civic life than this political history suggests. Though the Palestine Committee was not 
formed until 1959, the Movement had become the fabric for camp society before that. By 
1957, it could count forty UNRWA teachers among its members.121 Documents dated in 
1958 and signed al Shabab al ‘Arabi al Filastini, a cover name for the Palestine 
Committee’s network in Lebanon, reveal that Palestinian Arab Nationalists had begun 
operating with a degree of autonomy in the country before the Committee had even 
formalized its existence with the central ANM leadership. The makeup of Al Shabab’s 
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leadership moreover indicated the overlap between the Movement and camp civil society. 
Al Shabab’s six regional directors were Nathmi Kan’an (Tyre), Ibrahim Husayn ‘Ali 
(Sidon), ‘Abd al Karim Hamid (Beirut), Farj Mu’ad (Tripoli), and ‘Uthman Fa’ur (Biqa’), 
and Yamani served as their deputy director and Haddad their director; Kan’an, Mu’ad, 
Fa’ur, and Yamani used to direct the UNRWA Teachers Association as members of its 
six-person administrative council.122 Rallies boasted nationalist pride, and Al Tha’r and 
other publications and pamphlets connected the disparate communities in exile and 
unified their message. 
Reflecting on political engagement among Palestinians in Lebanon in the 1950s 
and 60s, Salah Salah said it was mediated through the Arab Nationalist Movement. “The 
political parties were minor to the Palestinians, minor in terms of what they could 
accomplish within for the camps. You’d find some individuals who were Communists, or 
Syrian Nationalists, or Baathists, but they didn’t have the confidence of the camps. The 
ones who were truly trusted were the Arab Nationalists. The Arab Nationalist Movement 
was the primary arena [al maydan al asasi], and it provided the distinguishing structures 
of the camps. It formed the Union of Palestinian Women, the workers associations, the 
student associations, and the Popular Committees in the camps.”123 Popular Committees 
institutionalized a network of refugee administration and asserted autonomy vis-à-vis 
UNRWA and the state.124 And the scouts became a pipeline to the militias, whether to Al 
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Shabab’s Shabab al Tha’r (Youth of Revenge) and ‘Abtal al ‘Awdah, 125 or later to Fatah 
or any of the many other clandestine groups. More than just a political-militant 
movement, the ANM’s less heralded, yet equally integral, role was to undergird civil 
society. 
AFTER PRISON – KING SAUD CHARITY SCHOOL – SECOND ARREST 
When Courvoisier terminated Yamani’s UNRWA employment in 1955, he had 
deprived the civic leader of a prominent post. But Yamani had already managed to lay the 
foundations of the many networks that would support his initiatives in his five years as a 
school administrator. And while he never stayed in the same job for long, his multiple 
reassignments allowed him to expand his initiatives and strengthen the social institutions 
he was assembling across the camps. (This was a pattern that would continue in the years 
following his termination, when he continued to change jobs as a private schools 
administrator). “This got me to encounter many teaching colleagues (Lebanese, 
Palestinians, Syrians, and Egyptians), and to connect positively with parents, especially 
in the Palestinian camps,” Yamani wrote. “And it made it easier for me to build 
organizational rings and cells within the framework of the ANM.”126 Yamani’s iron bond 
with the Movement, as well as with other teachers, students, scouts, and camp residents 
meant he would waste little time to return to building community after leaving prison. 
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Released from prison in August 1955 and terminated from his former 
employment, Yamani found new work as an assistant to the supervisor to the Beirut 
Community College, which had had a branch in Ba’albeck. Yamani travelled many times 
there, and reconnected with his students and former associates in Ghoro. But he was 
repeatedly harassed and arrested by General Security over the same accusations as before 
(publishing illegally, organizing clandestine meetings, inciting unrest, threatening 
authorities with bodily harm, etc.), and he left at the end of the school year in 1956, even 
though he still had his supervisor’s favor. 127 
That was all right, because for the 1956 school year, Yamani was appointed as the 
principal of the King Saud Charity School for Palestinian Refugees in Burj al Barajnah. 
The school was founded, as its name would suggest, through a generous donation from 
the Saudi king, of 10,000 pounds sterling. Saudi Arabia supported Palestinians in exile 
for decades, and though donations by their nature constrained the autonomy of the 
refugees, they furnished important social institutions and met a modicum of the refugees’ 
material needs. They also afforded the refugees some independence from UNRWA, and 
to a large degree Yamani was able to mold this school to his own ideal. This was made 
doubly possible by the facts that he was school’s first principal and that he played an 
integral role in its establishment.128 
King Saud School came about as a consequence of a network of cooperation 
between Palestinian civic leaders and sympathetic, well-connected Lebanese. Among 
them was Palestinian Ziab al Fahum, still the Inspector General of UNRWA’s Education 
Agency, who had earlier helped Yamani and Mu’ad grow the Scouting movement, and 
now again worked (presumably clandestinely) with Yamani, who had been expelled from 
                                                
127 On his tenure at Beirut Community College: Ibid., 2:77–9. 
128 On the establishment and administration of King Saud School: Ibid., 2:80–5. 
 76 
Agency employment. Fahum continued to demonstrate how Palestinians were 
manipulating UNRWA to meet their needs. 
The story begins with an act of tribute to the Saudi king. Muhamad Fistuq was a 
well-known Palestinian refugee who bred Arabian racehorses. One of them won at the 
Beirut Hippodrome on a day when King Saud was in attendance, and Fistuq gifted the 
animal to him. He thanked Fistuq generously and gave him a Cadillac and invited him to 
Saudi Arabia. Yamani, who was friends with Fistuq, and knowing of the King’s charity 
towards Palestinians, suggested they ask him for the money to open a secondary school 
for refugees. The two men presented their request to a Royal Advisor, who lobbied the 
King, who agreed. But Yamani and Fistuq were both Palestinians, and the state’s 
permitting system favored Lebanese. Yamani approached Fahum for help, and the 
Inspector General connected him with Muhamad Khalid, an eminent Beirut doctor known 
for his sympathy towards the refugees. Khalid obtained the necessary licenses, and they 
opened the school. On its four-member board of supervisors sat Khalid (President), 
Fistuq (Vice President), Fahum (Educational Supervisor), and Khalid al Farj (Member), a 
member of the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee in Lebanon. Yamani was paid 350 LL 
per month ($109). 
Three hundred students attended the school. Most of them were Palestinians, 
whom Yamani had invited from the camps across Lebanon; a few were Lebanese. In both 
of these traits, the student body bucked the UNRWA mode, which, through its rigid 
registration system, made it difficult for refugees to attend schools outside their camps, 
and moreover did not enroll Lebanese students in its schools, deepening the Palestinian 
isolation from the host country. The school had a science lab and a library, and, in the 
1957-8 school year, it opened a Girls’ Section with its own female principal, Jamila 
Khuri, and 60 students.  
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The school was aided, curiously, by Egypt, despite – or perhaps because of – the 
animosity between Nasser’s republic and the Saudi Kingdom. The country provided 
twelve teachers and paid for their salaries after Fahum approached the Culture Attaché. 
Unfortunately, Yamani doesn’t provide a record of their curriculum, but a speech he gave 
in December 1958 gives us an idea of his scholastic agenda. He delivered it to an 
audience of UNRWA teachers at the al Shabab clubhouse in ‘Ayn al Hilwah. It was a 
lament of their deteriorating efforts as compared to the conviction of the teachers of the 
early 1950s, especially in their lessons on Palestinian geography and history and Arabic 
language. Yamani’s comments are fervently patriotic; he stressed the value of a modern, 
particularly Arab education, and he impressed upon the teachers that their work is in the 
service in the nation. And he warns again against UNRWA: 
We cannot raise our children today as they used to raise them in the Ottoman era, 
or the Abbasid or Fatimid eras, for if we did that we would produce men ill-
prepared to live in the 20th century. … We must teach our students to love in their 
hearts the greater Arab nation as well as the smaller, local home. This can only 
happen through service to the society, which transforms abstract patriotism into 
action… [and by] underscoring the geographic and historical bonds of the whole 
of the Arab nation. … Ask yourselves: … Have you accustomed them to faithful 
expression, to insight and freedom? … Have you accustomed them to exert 
themselves in the service of all, and to distinguish the general from the personal 
interest?  … Have you engraved on their hearts and minds: Remember Palestine, 
and prepare to shed your blood for its retrieval? … Have you taught your students 
that what is called the Relief Agency [UNRWA] does nothing but squander our 
masses and exterminate our hopes of return?129 
As he had done at the UNRWA schools, Yamani instituted Nationalist slogans, 
rallies, and sports and scouting exercises. He organized to send scouts to a retreat in 
Alexandria in the school’s first year, and they attended at a moment of heightened 
Nationalist feeling, when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal; the charismatic leader 
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addressed the young men that were gathered from several Arab states. In all, the school 
represented what Yamani believed belonged to a Palestinian education: a breadth of 
books, experimental science, Palestinian history and geography, secondary-level classes 
for boys and girls, physical activity, a geographic cross-section of Palestinian students, 
association with other Arabs, and mass mobilization and the imbuement of Nationalist 
pride. On this last purpose, it appears that Yamani was especially successful. When 
Ahmad Shukayri, the former Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League (1950-56), 
the Saudi Ambassador to the United Nations (1957-62), and the first Chairman of the 
PLO (1964), visited the school in 1957, he said, “This isn’t an ordinary school. It’s a 
military college.”130 
It took only two years for Yamani’s scholastic program to land him in jail.131  In 
March 1958, he was arrested for provoking his students into tearing down a poster of 
King Saud during a pro-Nasser strike. He was undone by the symbolic irony. Strikes 
across Lebanon had ignited in response to news that the Saudi king was behind a failed 
plot to assassinate Nasser, who not a month before had declared the union of Syria and 
Egypt, a triumph of Arab Nationalism and a grave, political threat to Lebanese President 
Camille Chamoun. The mood in the country was terribly tense. Chamoun was despised 
by a large swath of the population – the Phalangists, the Muslim elite, and the Sunni 
street – for his ambivalence towards Nasser and his closeness with the West. News of the 
union drove a resurgence of support to federalize Lebanon within a greater Syrian or 
Arab state, especially among the country’s sizable and politically marginalized Sunni 
population. Practically every leading opposition politician had travelled to Damascus to 
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congratulate Nasser, while Chamoun hadn’t; the 1958 Civil War would begin just four 
months later. General Security was already interrogating Yamani’s students about his 
clandestine, Nationalist activities, to find cause to arrest him.132 This was easy: students 
were demonstrating for pan-Arabism (“What was taken by force can only be retaken by 
force, and the strength of the Arabs is contained in their unity,” they chanted), and they 
defiled an image of an ally of the independent Lebanese state. The King complained, and 
Yamani was imprisoned. His conviction was overturned on a technicality on July 15. 
Shortly after, Yamani was fired from his post.  
KUL MUWATIN KHAFIR AND AL SHABAB AL ‘ARABI AL FILASTINI ACTIVITIES 
1956, the year Yamani and his associates founded King Saud School, also marked 
the start of Yamani’s association with Kul Muwatin Khafir (Every Citizen is a Sentry), an 
anti-Zionist group that amplified the Palestinian and Arab Nationalist messages. It was 
led by Bashara al Dahhan, whom Yamani had met once before, in the 1948 War. Dahhan 
was a doctor, treating Palestinians in a Red Cross field hospital in Acre; it was to him 
Yamani had handed the PAWS documents that he had sneaked out for safekeeping. Kul 
Muwatin provided important political cover for Palestinians and al Shabab by virtue of 
being Lebanese. It may have had connections within security forces and the government, 
too; Yamani noted that al Shabab suffered less harassment at the hands of security forces 
as the two organizations got closer, and Yamani depended its leaders to win his release 
from prison in 1958. Kul Muwatin allowed al Shabab to publish in its name, which gave 
the articles some added weight and reduced the proscribed group’s exposure to 
                                                
132 Khashān, “Dhikrayāt ʿan ʾabi Māhir al-Yamānī.” 
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prosecution by the state. A 1959 Shabab internal memorandum thanked Kul Muwatin for 
supporting their campaign of strikes and negotiations with UNRWA.133 
Kul Muwatin organized lectures and commemorations at a range of cultural clubs 
through the country and had a Shaykh speak at mosques about the encroaching Zionist 
threat. On other instances, Kul Muwatin’s president, Bashara al Dahhan, called on 
Lebanon to deploy a National Guard to its south border and fortify its border villages, 
which he described as its front line with Israel. He also urged expatriates to support 
Lebanon as Jews did Israel, and called on Arab states to use oil as a weapon against 
Zionism and imperialism. Kul Muwatin’s newspaper al Yom al Masa’iyah, edited by 
Wafiq al Tabibi, regularly carried features on refugee affairs, UNRWA, and Zionism and 
published some of Yamani’s writings.  
The group was also able to organize large, public rallies that almost certainly 
would have been prohibited had al Shabab fronted them. Their rally at Beirut’s Municipal 
Stadium on the 11th anniversary of the Nakba, May 15, 1959, drew a crowd in the 
thousands; they were energized, patriotic, politically conscious, and eager to take back 
Palestine, according to a private letter sent to Yamani.134 Even more impressive might 
have been their rally in Tripoli on the same day. Tripoli’s population had always been 
favorable towards Palestinians, and it wouldn’t have been a surprise that the Prime 
Minister, Rashid Karami, himself a Sunni from Tripoli, spoke at the commemoration. 
What was notable, though, was that Yamani spoke on the same stage, too – Yamani, who 
had already been twice arrested for illegal political activity and whose affiliation with al 
Shabab and the ANM was well known. His role in the commemorations could not have 
                                                
133 On Kul Muwatin Khafir: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 3:248–58; Taqī al-Dīn, “Kul Muwāṭin Khafīr.” Al Shabab 
internal memorandum: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 3:98. 
134 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 3:285. 
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left any doubt about al Shabab’s involvement.135 The rallies in Beirut and Tripoli make 
clear the extent that the Palestinian civic leadership had managed to mobilize the 
refugees, engage the Lebanese, and forge productive alliances deep within Lebanese 
society, eleven years after being dispersed into exile and ignored.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Nakba commemoration, organized by Kul Muwatin Khafir. Palestinians and 
Lebanese in attendance. Beirut Municipal Stadium136  
                                                
135 Transcription of the speeches, and a photocopy of a four-page al Shabab pamphlet marking the 
anniversary: Ibid., 3:259–81. 
136 Source: Ibid., 2:246 (n.d.). 
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A trove of correspondence from this period indicates that al Shabab and the 
Popular Committees were applying pressure to UNRWA and the state beyond rallies, too. 
Al Shabab organized short boycotts of UNRWA services in December 1958 and January 
to oppose what appeared to be continuing efforts to resettle the refugees and, 
simultaneously, exclude them from services and society. In a letter to Nour al-Din al-
Rifa’i, the director of the state’s Central Committee of Palestinian Refugee Affairs, al 
Shabab demanded that UNRWA cancel its “self-reliance” program to remove refugees 
from the benefits rolls, as it had already done to 8,939 of them. Perhaps al Shabab hoped 
to appeal to the Lebanese official’s sense of pride, and they pointed out that in no other 
country did UNRWA cut off income earners from living assistance. They also requested 
Rifa’i put pressure on the Agency to fire the director of the “self-reliance” program. In 
January, al Shabab secured a meeting with the Leslie Carver, the international UNRWA 
director, where they repeated their demands, and they met at least twice in the spring with 
the Lebanon Agency director, Marcel E. Beroudiaux. In June, Beroudiaux wrote to 
Yamani with a concession: he acknowledged the hardship caused by the Biqa’ Valley aid 
distribution regime, which required refugees to pick up provisions in person in Ba’albeck, 
and promised to have Agency officials visit dense concentrations of Palestinians on a 
fixed schedule, instead. He also confirmed that he had installed additional water taps in 
Baddawi, though the residents were still complaining of a water shortage. Still, he wrote 
to Yamani, “You confirmed to me that the present system provided for a distribution of 
the available water to them is much more equitable than before.”137 
The letter to Rifa’i lodged other complaints, as well. Among them, it protested 
that when UNRWA opened new health clinics in the cities, it removed others from the 
                                                
137 Ibid., 3:62–87, 3:98–104. Quote from p. 83. 
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camps. It asked for the authorities to expand access to vocational education and noted 
that UNRWA had thus far only opened two technical institutes (one in Hazmiyyah and 
one in Tripoli) and mismanaged both. It demanded that authorities stop expelling 
refugees from the Beirut suburbs. It complained that students couldn’t afford to enroll 
outside of UNRWA schools, which were insufficient in number and quality. It protested 
that scholarships were too meager and too scarce and were anyways too often granted by 
connection. And so forth.  
The Popular Committees also wrote to the UNRWA Administration, directly. A 
letter from Nabatieh dated June 1958, for example, noted the improvements made to 
settlements in Dabieh, Jisr al Basha, and Baddawi demanded equal treatment. Among 
other things, it required that the UNRWA school offer secondary-level classes and that 
the Agency hire more teachers, install clinics and a pharmacy, improve nutrition services, 
and register new camp residents. The letter threatened, “If you don’t execute our requests 
quickly, we are prepared to resist UNRWA and take the appropriate measures.”138 
The 1958 and 1959 letters reveal the crushing deprivations of camp life, after a 
decade in exile. The Popular Committee of ‘Ain al Hilwah wrote that the local hospital, 
Labib abu Thahir, was not accepting patients from the camp and demanded that UNRWA 
provide rations for all newborns and make first aid available day and night. The 
Committee also called on UNRWA to eliminate the benefits ceiling and to give residents 
zinc metal roofs, and it condemned the state police for obstructing construction efforts. A 
letter from Burj al Barajnah conveys astonishing squalor. It complains of swamps and 
spoiling rations and a shortage of latrines – it counts just one per five hundred people. It 
requests a camp clinic, doctors, and zinc. Burj al Shimali also requested a clinic, a doctor, 
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and midwives. It complained that the shortage of schoolrooms meant students could only 
attend for half-days, as a way to ease the overcrowding. Nabatieh also asked for better 
educational facilities and classes through fourth grade secondary. Nearly all the popular 
committees complained about malnutrition, the state’s onerous permit system, and 
UNRWA’s refusal to register any new refugees or update their places of residence. And 
the popular committee of an informal agglomeration of 6,000 refugees in Al Barghaliyah 
and Al Qasamiyah, near Tyre, petitioned the Central Committee of Palestinian Refugee 
Affairs to incorporate them as a camp, so that they could receive proper services such as 
clean water, a clinic with a doctor, a milk dispensary, and a benefits center.139 
An undated letter from al Shabab to President Fuad Chehab (1958-64) attempted 
to smooth over relations between refugees and the state and to relieve pressure from the 
state security apparatuses. On the proliferation of organizations, activities, and 
demonstrations, which UNRWA and state security forces treated as subversive and 
criminal, the letter explained that the refugees were blameless, and acting within their 
rights to secure their livelihoods and liberate Palestine. “The Palestinians understand that 
as guests in Lebanon they must not interfere in local issues. We have confidence that the 
relevant authorities in your administration will treat Palestinians on a sound basis and 
will treat them as a peoples with potential who live in Lebanon, the civilized, developed 
society whose sons enjoy freedom and civic life,” it stated.140 It continued to say that the 
refugees did not have faith in UNRWA’s intentions and required the Agency to improve 
its services and provisions. It also complained about the state’s glacial and discriminatory 
bureaucracy, which made it difficult for refugees to acquire the necessary permits to 
travel, work, and conduct other everyday affairs. Al Shabab asked the President to 
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resolve their complaints with the state and its security forces, and offered to cooperate 




Though Yamani’s conviction for inciting the student strike in 1958 was 
overturned, the King Saud School nevertheless unceremoniously fired him from his post 
as principal, and he was forced to find a new job. He was hired to be the headmaster of 
the Maqasid Institute’s Khalid bin al Walid Secondary School in Beirut in 1959, where 
he also taught Arabic and arithmetic. His salary was 340LL per month. And as al Shabab 
al 'Arabi al Filastini and the Arab Nationalist Movement continued to escalate their civic 
and political activities in this period, so too did the Lebanese Security Forces of the 
Deuxieme Bureau chase after its leadership and Yamani with increased vigor. In early 
1962, Yamani was forbidden from being in Beirut between 7pm and 6am, and he had to 
present a letter every month to the police attesting to his employment. Later that year, he 
was imprisoned for a year for directing the activities of an “illegal party” – presumably, 
the ANM.141 Guards would beat him and inflict bastinado and shave his head.142 Yamani 
left his job with Maqasid in 1965, and in 1967 he opened a new, Arab Nationalist 
secondary school in Burj al Barajnah that was sponsored by the Movement. Its initial 
enrollment was 117 students, and it remained open until 1976.143 Yamani also founded a 
network of cultural centers in the camps in the 1950s and 60s.144  
The history of Palestinians in exile is better recorded for the 1960s. In 1964, 
Ahmad Shukayri, the League of Arab States-appointed representative of the Palestinians 
to the same institution, established the Palestinian Liberation Organization to function as 
                                                
141 Ibid., 2:88–93. 
142 Oh his prison treatment: Ibid., 2:106. Sayigh colorfully describes Deuxieme Bureau oppression 
(Palestinians, 150–52).  
143 Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 2:102. They named it the Lebanese Secondary School. The Movement paid 25,000 
LL to another school owner to obtain his unused secondary school license.  
144 Ibid., 3:143. 
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the state-in-exile for the Palestinian people. The PLO consolidated existing civic 
institutions under its umbrella, such as student groups, teachers’ associations, women’s 
unions and workers’ unions. Hence, a number of general Palestinian unions – federalized 
networks of sectorial associations that stretched across borders – sprouted in this era, 
such as the General Unions of Palestinian Women, Teachers, and Writers and Journalists. 
The General Union of Palestinian Students and the General Union of Palestinian workers 
predated the PLO, but they too were incorporated into its framework. 
Yamani attended the first conference of the General Union of Palestinian Workers 
(GUPW) in Gaza in 1964. He was elected the union’s Deputy General Secretary. In 
Lebanon, Yamani helped to found the union’s regional branch, the Union of Palestinian 
Workers – Lebanon, and served as its secretary. Salah Salah described its modus 
operandi to me: 
[The UPW]’s methods were direct pressure on the employer. For example, at a 
construction project, the manager isn’t treating them fairly. The UPW agrees with 
the workers, that if they want to go on strike, the UPW will make sure no scab 
labor goes in to take your jobs.145 
The UPW also established a social security fund for its members. It maintained its offices 
within the PLO headquarters in Corniche al Mazra’a, Beirut. 
Still, the PLO in its initial iteration was politically weak and hardly representative 
of the Palestinian masses. The organization’s deference to the League (seen at the time as 
an instrument of Nasser), its constitution of Palestinians professionals and former 
notables and its detachment from camp residents, and Shukayri’s self-serving image 
challenged its legitimacy in the eyes of many refugees. But the rapid defeat in the 1967 
War discredited the League of Arab States and the governing Arab regimes and swept 
                                                
145 Salah, Interview with the author. On the establishment of the GUPW/UPW-Lebanon and its activities in 
Lebanon, see ʻAli ̄, al-ʻUmma ̄l al-Filast ̣i ̄ni ̄yu ̄n wa-masa ̄r al-h ̣arakah al-niqa ̄bi ̄yah, 41–56. Approximately 
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Shukayri out of power. At the same time, Fatah, boosted by the tactical victory at the 
Battle of Karamah in 1968, became the new standard bearer of the Palestinian cause, and 
in 1969 Yassir Arafat became the chairman of the PLO. The marriage of the armed 
struggle to the PLO injected the organization with the legitimacy it once lacked, and it 
quickly transformed into a muscular, para-statal institution. That same year, the camps in 
Lebanon erupted against the Lebanese security forces, and the commander of the 
Lebanese Army, Emile Bustani, signed the Cairo Accord with Arafat. It was a major 
concession of sovereignty to the Palestinians and put the camps under the total authority 
of the PLO. The state also eased movement restrictions on the refugees, removed the 
work permit regime, permitted Palestinian militants to openly recruit, fundraise, and 
train, and allowed them to infiltrate Israel along prescribed routes in the south. These 
events in Lebanon have been remembered collectively as a revolution. As a camp 
resident said to Rosemary Sayigh in the 1970s: 
Before the Revolution I and all Palestinians wondered how we could return to 
Palestine. As a Palestinian I felt that I must have a role in the struggle… The 
Revolution was the most important event, not just in my life, but in the life of the 
Palestinian people. Our understanding, our talk, our thinking all changed. Before 
there was reactionary thinking, now there is revolutionary thinking.146 
Fawaz Turki wrote this in his memoir of the new consciousness, “In a short time 
the term Palestinian became identified not with the downtrodden refugee living in abject 
poverty, but with the young dedicated freedom fighter.”147  
The prevailing mood sent flocks of young Palestinians to the guerillas, and 
Habash’s contingent in the fractured ANM, which included the ‘Abtal al ‘Awda militia 
that Yamani helped to found, morphed into the PFLP. Yamani was named a member of 
the group’s Central Committee and its Politburo. As for civic institutions, the PLO’s new 
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clout meant that its general unions, once operating semi-autonomously of it, were now 
politicized, and their nominal functions were subordinated to the national cause.148 
Yamani’s own role in this process is reflected in his memoirs. By the late 1960s, it 
appeared that Yamani had bought in fully to the PLO paradigm of a Palestinian 
institution independent of the Arab states and abandoned Arab Nationalism in praxis. He 
was elected to the PLO’s Palestinian National Council and from there to the Executive 
Committee. His portfolio on the Executive included the Bureau of Popular Organization, 
and in this position he consolidated the network of popular committees that he had helped 
to found under the aegis of the PLO.149 
REFLECTIONS 
Though it took until 1969 for the camps in Lebanon to install the PLO and adopt 
its civic and political frameworks, these developments were preceded by two decades of 
Palestinian organization. Camp residents built or reconstructed from Mandatory Palestine 
many of the institutions that the PLO would incorporate, and the armed struggle relied on 
the schools and the scouts to imbue a young generation with strength, judgment, 
knowledge, and a national consciousness. Unheralded leaders forced UNRWA and the 
state to recognize grassroots organizations – such as the Teachers’ Association, the 
popular committees, al Shabab al ‘Arabi al Filastini, and the Union of Palestinian 
Workers – as the representations of refugee interests. Palestinians improved their own 
welfare through sacrifice, backbreaking work, and emigration, and they protected 
themselves by carving out space for an autonomous, civic society. They broke the state’s 
efforts to isolate them in camps, and they succeeded in securing certain concessions – not 
                                                
148 ‘Ali argues that the GUPW from the beginning was only loosely oriented towards class struggle and 
much more concerned with the national cause. He points out that the first conference declaration laid out 
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tremendous ones, but important ones, such as new schools, a Palestinian curriculum, and 
improved health services and access to sanitation. And through their publications and 
their inspired rallies, the refugees drew the attention of Lebanese society and politicians, 
and they formed solidarities with powerful actors and marginalized citizens. These bonds 
would prove to be especially consequential in the months leading to the Revolution.150 
As Brand has written, “The 1950s was a critical formative period for the later 
development of the quasi-governmental institutions that emerged throughout the 
Palestinian diaspora.”151 Sayigh highlights the groundwork of the ANM: “Nor, probably, 
would [the 1969 Revolution] have mobilized the masses on such a large scale without the 
vanguard work of activists like those of the Arab Nationalist Movement during the 
refugee period.”152 One of Sayigh’s subjects even identifies Yamani as a leader in the 
events: “A large number of the Revolution’s leaders are from the camps, some in the first 
rank, such as Abu Maher, or Abu Ahmad Yunis – we needn’t mention names but they are 
a large number.”153 Though this groundwork has not gone unacknowledged by other 
scholars, it has gone unexamined. This biography has described the organizational 
activities within the 1950s Lebanon camps with more color. It has also traced the 
continuity of the social transformations of the Mandate era to camp society in the 
diaspora. The processes that drew peasants to continuing education, and then to urban 
areas and to wage labor, and to mass politics and national identification – these refined 
                                                
150 I have not covered the solidarities between the Palestinians and the Lebanese in the lead up to the 1969 
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Yamani into a young leader. He reconnected with his PAWS and nationalist associates in 
exile, and, through UNRWA as well, the scattered refugees exerted their will to construct 
camp society. Yamani also exerted his will on the Arab Nationalist Movement’s 
evolution, by carving out autonomy for the Palestinian branch, al Shabab al ‘Arabi al 
Filastini. Most of all, this biography has foregrounded assertive, grassroots Palestinian 
leadership in exile. 
 92 




Lebanese Liras (LL) per 






























Table A1.  The nominal exchange rate154 
                                                
154 Source: IMF eLibrary. 
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Appendix B. Scouts, Rallies, and Athletics (photographs) 
 
Figure A1. Palestinian girl scouts in Lebanon155 
                                                
155 Source: Yama ̄ni ̄, Tajribati ̄, 2:260 (n.d.). 
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Figure A2. Palestinian scouts – Fawj al Tha’r battalion156 
                                                
156 Source: Ibid., 2:259 (n.d.). 
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Figure A3. Palestinian student athletes competing in a meet 
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